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Abstract
We investigate the combination of fragments of classical logic as a way
of conservatively extending a given Boolean logic by the addition of new
connectives, and we precisely characterize the circumstances in which such
a combination produces the corresponding fragment of classical logic over
the signature containing connectives from both fragments given as input.
If the thereby produced combined fragment is only incompletely character-
ized by the components given as input, this means that connectives from
one component need to interact with connectives from the other compo-
nent, giving rise to interaction principles. The main contributions strongly
rely on the (well-known) description of the 2-valued clones made by Post,
on the (not so well-known) axiomatization procedures for 2-valued matri-
ces laid out by Rautenberg, and on Avron’s non-deterministic matrices,
which have (recently) been used to produce a significant advance on the
understanding of the semantics of fibring.
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of this paper. This research was done under the scope of R&D Unit 50008, funded by the
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1 Introduction
In what concerns the extensibility of the language of a given logic by some new
connective respecting certain inferential patterns, one of the main criteria in-
voked in justifying, granting intelligibility, or acknowledging the legitimacy of
such an extension is the ‘conservativeness restraint’. According to such restraint,
the addition of a new connective together with its corresponding characterizing
rules should not allow for novel inferences to arise using exclusively the orig-
inal language, involving formulas deprived of such connective. Arguably, an
equally important but much less discussed criterion involves the possible emer-
gence, through such extension, of ‘interaction principles’ involving the newly
added connective and other connectives from the original language extended
therewith.
The most common proof formalisms used in the literature in discussing how
rules give meaning to the connectives they govern, originated from the land-
mark work of Gentzen [15], typically allow for interaction to arise in rather
unexpected ways. For an example, one might recall that logics containing con-
junction and disjunction often have as algebraic counterparts some variety of
lattices or another. However, the existence of non-distributive lattices does not
seem to be matched in a natural way by logics whose disjunction does not dis-
tribute over conjunction. Quite to the contrary, the canonical presentations
of the latter connectives in natural deduction or sequent calculi in general en-
joy distributivity as an artifact that is produced by the very choice of proof
formalisms (cf. [3, 18]). Excessive interaction might also be held responsible
for ‘collapsing phenomena’ in which two connectives turn out to be indistin-
guishable when their rules are put together for the definition of a single logic
containing both connectives. There is for instance a well-known debate in the
literature about the presentation of a logic containing both a classical and an
intuitionistic implication (cf. [13]). The common arguments according to which
these two implications would necessarily coincide are however based either on
the (incorrect) assumption that the minimal logic that contains two standard
implications enjoys an unrestricted version of the Deduction Metatheorem, or
on some (incidental or artificial) demand for other meta-properties that are
expressed in a Gentzen-style formalism (cf. [14, 9, 11]).
The main known mechanisms for combining logics often differ on how they
deal with conservativeness and interaction. Among such combination mecha-
nisms, fibring fares well on both fronts: unintended interaction is unlikely to
arise through fibring, and the fibring of two logics containing no quasi theorems
(formulas that follow from whatsoever non-empty set of premises) is always
conservative over each component (cf. [21]). Within the scope of such a com-
bination mechanism the ideas concerning the addition of a new connective to
a given logic can be made clear and distinct, and the related questions may
be given precise answers. It is worth noting, in particular, that the smallest
logic that conservatively extends both the ‘logic of conjunction’ and the ‘logic
of disjunction’ is not distributive (cf. [21]), and also noting that the smallest
logic that conservatively extends both the logics of classical implication and of
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intuitionistic implication does not actually necessitate the collapse between the
latter connectives (cf. [8]). In fact, the results in the present paper imply that
it is even plausible to have two non-collapsing copies of classical implication
cohabiting the same logic. In both the above mentioned examples, and in many
others, the corresponding joint fragments of classical logic can be recovered by
the addition of inference rules capturing the emerging interaction principles.
A neat characterization of fibring is given by way of Hilbert calculi: the
combination of two logics, each one characterized by a certain set of inference
rules, is produced by the union of these sets of rules. In contrast —and in a sense
precisely for being so frugal on what concerns interaction principles— fibring
resisted admitting a straightforward semantics (see [5, 10] for an overview).
Indeed, among other phenomena to be discussed in the present contribution,
it is worth noting that one could very well happen to fiber the logics of two
connectives with 2-valued semantics and end up giving origin to a logic with
no finite-valued semantics whatsoever, even if non-determinism were allowed.
Nonetheless, after an important theoretical advance contributed by [20], we
now know that a semantics for disjoint fibring may be given through a powerful
and elegant technology that makes use of non-deterministic semantics. This
technology is applied in the present paper to the combination of fragments of
classical logic, as a way of illustrating how rich is the problem that the new
semantics allows solving.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall a number of neces-
sary definitions and facts regarding logics, their semantics and axiomatizations.
In particular, we introduce logical matrices and Nmatrices, as well as some
important properties and operations on them. We put special emphasis on clas-
sical logic, and on Post’s characterization of Boolean clones. We also recall the
essential mechanism of fibring, and we prove some useful results about fibred
logics and their derived connectives. Several fundamental facts about disjoint
fibrings of fragments of classical logic and the characterizations of the resulting
logics are then proved in Section 3, along with several illustrative examples.
The general plan draws to a close, in Section 4, by proving the main announced
results concerning the combination of fragments of classical logic and by a rec-
ollection of what has been accomplished along the way towards attaining the
stated goals. This is followed in Section 5 by some pointers to directions for
future research.
2 Preliminaries
This section contains the main definitions, fixes the notation for the rest of the
paper, recalls several important notions and well-known results, makes some
remarks, and presents a few new simple and useful facts.
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2.1 Syntax
A propositional signature Σ is a family {Σ(k)}k∈N of sets, where each Σ
(k)
contains the k-place connectives of Σ. To simplify notation, we express the fact
that c© ∈ Σ(k) for some k ∈ N by simply writing c© ∈ Σ, and we write Σ1 ∪ Σ2
(resp., Σ1 ∩ Σ2) to denote the signature Σ such that Σ
(k) = Σ
(k)
1 ∪ Σ
(k)
2 (resp.,
Σ(k) = Σ
(k)
1 ∩Σ
(k)
2 ) for all k ∈ N. We also write Σ1 ⊆ Σ2 when Σ
(k)
1 ⊆ Σ
(k)
2 for all
k ∈ N. The signatures Σ1 and Σ2 are said to be disjoint when Σ1∩Σ2 = ∅. The
language LΣ(P ) is the carrier of the absolutely free Σ-algebra generated over
a given set of sentential variables P . Elements of LΣ(P ) are called formulas.
Given a formula ϕ ∈ LΣ(P ), we denote by var(ϕ) (resp. sub(ϕ)) the set of
variables (resp. subformulas) of ϕ, recursively defined as usual; the extension
of var and sub from formulas to sets thereof is defined as one would expect.
We say that two (sets of) formulas share no variables if their underlying sets
of variables are disjoint. If ϕ /∈ P we say that ϕ is compound, and we denote
by head(ϕ) its outermost connective. As usual, given a 1-place connective c©,
we define the possible nestings of c© as c©0p := p and c©i+1p := c©( c©ip).
When appropriate, given any symbol s, we will use sk to denote a sequence of k
consecutive occurrences of s.
A substitution is a mapping σ : P −→ LΣ(P ), uniquely extendable into an
endomorphism ·σ : LΣ(P ) −→ LΣ(P ). Given Γ ⊆ LΣ(P ), we denote by Γ
σ
the set {ϕσ : ϕ ∈ Γ}. We take a k-place derived connective λp1 . . . pk. ϕ, also
denoted by ϕ(p1, . . . , pk) when convenient, to be a formula ϕ ∈ LΣ({p1, . . . , pk}).
Given two signatures Ξ and Σ, a (homophonic) translation t : Ξ −→ LΣ(P ) is
a mapping that assigns to each k-place connective ξ ∈ Ξ a formula t(ξ) ∈
LΣ({p1, . . . , pk}) (understood as a derived k-place connective λp1 . . . pk. t(ξ)).
Such translation extends naturally into a function t : LΞ(P ) −→ LΣ(P ), defined
by setting t(p) := p for p ∈ P , and t(ξ(ψ1, . . . , ψk)) := t(ξ)(t(ψ1), . . . , t(ψk))
for ξ ∈ Ξ(k). We use idΣ : Σ −→ LΣ(P ) to refer to the identity translation
defined by setting idΣ( c©) := c©(p1, . . . , pk) for each k-place connective c© ∈ Σ.
Given disjoint signatures Ξ1 and Ξ2, and translations t1 : Ξ1 −→ LΣ1(P ) and
t2 : Ξ2 −→ LΣ2(P ), we use t1 ∪ t2 : Ξ1 ∪ Ξ2 −→ LΣ1∪Σ2(P ) to denote their
union.
Given signatures Σ ⊆ Ξ, let XΣ := {xϕ : ϕ ∈ LΞ(P ) \ P and head(ϕ) /∈ Σ}
be a new set of sentential variables. Using XΣ to see as ‘monoliths’ the formulas
from Ξ whose heads are alien to Σ, we can represent in LΣ(P∪XΣ) the Σ-skeleton
of any formula ϕ ∈ LΞ(P ) by setting skelΣ(p) := p if p ∈ P , and setting for each
connective c© ∈ Ξ(k):
skelΣ( c©(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk)) :=
{
c©(skelΣ(ϕ1), . . . , skelΣ(ϕk)), if c© ∈ Σ
x c©(ϕ1,...,ϕk), otherwise.
It is handy to note here that sub(skelΣ(ϕ)) ⊆ skelΣ(sub(ϕ)). This implies, given
Γ ⊆ LΞ(P ), that skelΣ(Γ) is closed under subformulas whenever Γ is closed
under subformulas.
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2.2 Logics
A logic L is a structure 〈Σ,⊢〉, where Σ is a signature and ⊢ ⊆ 2LΣ(P )×LΣ(P )
is a substitution-invariant (Tarskian) consequence relation over LΣ(P ). The set
Γ ⊆ LΣ(P ) is called an L-theory whenever Γ is closed under ⊢, that is Γ
⊢ := {ϕ :
Γ ⊢ ϕ} ⊆ Γ. We obtain an equivalence relation ⊣⊢L on sets of formulas of L by
defining Γ,∆ ⊆ LΣ(P ) as (logically) equivalent when Γ
⊢ = ∆⊢. An L-theory Γ⊢
is said to be trivial if (Γσ)⊢ = LΣ(P ) for every substitution σ : P −→ LΣ(P ),
and otherwise said to be non-trivial. Two connectives c©1, c©2 ∈ Σ
(k) for some
k ∈ N are said to be indistinguishable in a logic L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 provided that
ϕ ⊣⊢L t(ϕ) for every ϕ ∈ LΣ(P ), where t : Σ → LΣ(P ) is the translation that
replaces every occurrence of c©1 with c©2, that is, t( c©1) = c©2(p1, . . . , pk) and
t( c©) = c©(p1, . . . , pj) for every connective c© ∈ Σ
(j) \ { c©1} and every j ∈ N.
Let ϕ(p1, . . . , pk) be some k-place derived connective. If ϕ(p1, . . . , pk) ⊢ pj
for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k, we say that ϕ is projective on its j-th component. Such a
derived connective is called a projection-conjunction if it is logically equivalent
to its set of projective components, i.e., if there is some J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k} such
that (i) ϕ(p1, . . . , pk) ⊢ pj for every j ∈ J and (ii) {pj : j ∈ J} ⊢ ϕ(p1, . . . , pk).
In case ϕ(p1, . . . , pk) ⊢ pk+1, we say that ϕ is bottom-like. We will call ϕ top-like
if ∅ ⊢ ϕ(p1, . . . , pk). Do note that the latter is a particular case of projection-
conjunction (take J = ∅). Another particular case of projection-conjunction is
given by the affirmation connective λp1. p1. A derived connective that is neither
top-like nor bottom-like will here be called significant ; if in addition it is not a
projection-conjunction, we will call it very significant. Note that failing to be
very significant means being either bottom-like or a projection-conjunction. In
case p1, . . . , pk ⊢ ϕ(p1, . . . , pk), we will say that ϕ is truth-preserving. Obviously,
all projection-conjunctions are truth-preserving.
2.3 Hilbert calculi
A Hilbert calculus H is a structure 〈Σ, R〉 where Σ is a signature, and
R ⊆ 2LΣ(P ) × LΣ(P ) is a set of so-called inference rules. Given 〈∆, ψ〉 ∈ R, we
refer to ∆ as the set of premises and to ψ as the conclusion of the rule. When ∆
is empty, ψ is dubbed an axiom. An inference rule 〈∆, ψ〉 ∈ R is often denoted
by ∆
ψ
, or simply by ψ1 ... ψn
ψ
if ∆ = {ψ1, . . . , ψn} is finite, or by ψ if ∆ = ∅.
It is well-known that a Hilbert calculus H := 〈Σ, R〉 induces a logic LH :=
〈Σ,⊢H 〉 such that, for each Γ ⊆ LΣ(P ), Γ
⊢H is the least set that contains Γ
and is closed under all applications of instances of the inference rules in R, that
is, if ∆
ψ
∈ R and σ : P −→ LΣ(P ) is such that ∆
σ ⊆ Γ⊢H then ψσ ∈ Γ⊢H .
Such definition of a logic induced by a Hilbert calculus is meant to capture the
‘schematic character’ of inference rules.
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2.4 Logical matrices and Nmatrices
An Nmatrix M over a signature Σ is a structure 〈V,D, ·M〉 where1 V is a set
(of truth-values), D ⊆ V is the set of designated values and, for each c© ∈ Σ(k),
·M gives the interpretation c©M : V
k −→ 2V \{∅} of c© in M. We use U to shall
refer to the set V \D of undesignated values. Henceforth we will assume that we
are dealing only with non-degenerate Nmatrices, in the sense that D 6= ∅ and
U 6= ∅. Clearly, such restriction will only leave out a couple of uninteresting
logics. When D is a singleton we will say thatM is unitary. The traditional, and
deterministic, notion of (logical) matrix is recovered by considering Nmatrices
for which the image of every tuple of values through c©
M
is a singleton, in which
case we often drop the braces from the set notation.
A valuation over M is a mapping v : LΣ(P ) −→ V such that for each
c© ∈ Σ(k) we have v( c©(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) ∈ c©M(v(ϕ1), . . . , v(ϕk)). We denote by
ValP (M) the set of all valuations on LΣ(P ) over M. It is often useful to work
with partially defined valuations, i.e., valuations defined only for a certain sub-
set Γ of the language. This is perfectly usual when dealing with logical matrices,
as one only needs to define the value of the sentential variables in var(Γ), for then
the corresponding valuation extends uniquely to the full language. In Nmatrices,
the same effect can be achieved by defining a valuation for a set of formulas Γ
that is closed under subformulas, and demanding that it respects the inter-
pretation of connectives, that is, v( c©(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) ∈ c©M(v(ϕ1), . . . , v(ϕn)) for
every compound formula c©(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ∈ Γ. Such a partial valuation, which
we dub a Γ-partial valuation, can always be extended to a valuation over the
full language (cf. [1]).
As usual, we say that a valuation v over M satisfies a formula ϕ (resp. a
set of formulas Γ) if v(ϕ) ∈ D (resp. v(Γ) ⊆ D). We say that Γ ⊢M ϕ if
every valuation over M that satisfies Γ also satisfies ϕ. It is well known that
LM := 〈Σ,⊢M〉 induces a logic, and we call it the logic characterized byM. IfM is
a finite Nmatrix (i.e., its underlying set of truth-values is finite) then LM is said
to be finitely-Nvalued, or k-Nvalued if M has exactly k truth-values; when M
is a finite logical matrix then LM is said more simply to be finitely-valued, or
k-valued. A logic L is said to be (deterministically) many-valued if L = LM for
some logical matrix M (cf. [22]).
Given the schematic character of inference rules in Hilbert calculi, we will
say that about a valuation v that it respects an inference rule ∆
ψ
if, for every
substitution σ : P −→ LΣ(P ), we have that v(∆
σ) ⊆ D implies v(ψσ) ∈ D.
Consider the signature Σ such that Σ(k) = { c©} and Σ(j) = ∅ for j 6= k.
We will denote by ⊤ c© the logic induced, equivalently, by the matrix M⊤c© :=
〈{0, 1}, {1}, ·⊤〉 where c©⊤ (a1, . . . , ak) = 1 for all a1, . . . , ak ∈ {0, 1}, or by the
Hilbert calculus with the single axiom
c©(p1,...,pk)
, and we will denote by ⊥ c©
the logic induced, equivalently, by the matrix M⊥c© := 〈{0, 1}, {1}, ·⊥〉 where
c©⊥ (a1, . . . , ak) = 0 for all a1, . . . , ak ∈ {0, 1}, or by the Hilbert calculus with
the single rule
c©(p1,...,pk)
pk+1
. It is easy to see that in the former case the k-
1〈V, ·M〉 is a multi-algebra, see [16, 12].
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place connective c© is a top-like connective, and that in the latter case it is
a bottom-like connective. In addition, by ⊥⊤ c© we will denote the logic of an
unrestrained connective induced, equivalently, by the 2-valued Nmatrix M⊥⊤c© :=
〈{0, 1}, {1}, ·⊥⊤〉 where c©⊥⊤ (a1, . . . , ak) = {0, 1} for all a1, . . . , ak ∈ {0, 1}, or by
the Hilbert calculus with the empty set of rules.
2.5 Some useful operations on (N)matrices
Let Ξ,Σ be signatures, t : Ξ −→ LΣ(P ) be a translation, andM := 〈V,D, ·M〉
be a logical matrix over Σ. Then we may say that M induces an interpretation
ξM : V
k −→ V under t to each connective ξ ∈ Ξ, defined in the case of a k-
place connective by setting ξM(a1, . . . , ak) := v(t(ξ)) where v is any valuation
such that v(pi) = ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We denote by Mt the matrix over Ξ with
the same truth-values and designated values as M, where each ξ ∈ Ξ receives
its interpretation induced under t. Is is clear that ValP (Mt) = {v ◦ t : v ∈
ValP (M)}.
Let κ ∈ N ∪ {ω}, with κ > 1. An Nmatrix M := 〈V,D, ·M〉 over Σ is said to
be κ-saturated if for any sets Γ,∆ ⊆ LΣ(P ) with |∆| ≤ κ, if Γ 6⊢M ψ for each
ψ ∈ ∆ then there exists a valuation v overM such that v(Γ) ⊆ D and v(∆) ⊆ U .
We say that M is saturated if it is ω-saturated (more generally, we might talk
about κ-saturation, where κ the cardinality of the underlying language). Note
that in a saturated Nmatrix M every LM-theory is precisely characterized by a
valuation, that is, for every LM-theory Γ there is a valuation v overM such that
Γ = {ϕ ∈ LΣ(P ) : v(ϕ) ∈ D}. Clearly, if M is κ-saturated then so is Mt.
The n-power of M is the Nmatrix Mn := 〈V n, Dn, ·n〉 where, for each k-
place connective c© ∈ Σ, we have c©n(α1, . . . , αk) = {α ∈ V
n : πi(α) ∈
c©
M
(πi(α1), . . . , πi(αk)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, where each πi : V
n −→ V denotes
the corresponding i-th projection. Note that ValP (Mn) = ValP (M)n, that is, a
valuation on Mn is just an n-tuple of valuations on M. From [20] we know that
Mn is n-saturated and LM = LMn , for every Nmatrix M. Given a translation
t : Ξ −→ LΣ(P ), it is straightforward to see that (Mt)n = (Mn)t for every
n ∈ N ∪ {ω}, n > 1.
Let Σ1 and Σ2 be disjoint signatures. Given Nmatrices M1 := 〈V1, D1, ·M1〉
over Σ1 and M2 := 〈V2, D2, ·M2〉 over Σ2, their strict product M1 ⋆M2 is the
Nmatrix over Σ1∪Σ2 defined by 〈V12, D12, ·⋆〉 where V12 = (D1×D2)∪(U1×U2),
D12 = D1 ×D2, and for each k-place c© ∈ Σ1 ∪Σ2,
c©⋆((a1, b1), . . . , (ak, bk)) :=
{
{(a, b) ∈ V12 : a ∈ c©M1(a1, . . . , ak)}, if c© ∈ Σ1
{(a, b) ∈ V12 : b ∈ c©M2(b1 . . . , bk)}, if c© ∈ Σ2
Note that a valuation v overM1 ⋆M2 has two projections π1(v) and π2(v) which
(under the obvious restrictions to LΣ1(P ) and LΣ2(P )) are valuations over M1
and M2. We know from [20] that M1 ⋆M2 is saturated when both M1 and M2
are saturated.
The following lemma is very useful in practice, as it tells us how to build in
a component-wise manner valuations in an Nmatrix obtained by strict product.
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Recall that given a Σ-Nmatrix M, if v is a Γ-partial valuation over M with
Γ ⊆ LΣ(P ), and we are given a sentential variable p /∈ var(Γ), then v may
always be extended to a (Γ ∪ {p})-partial valuation v′ by assigning v′(p) = a
for any truth-value a in the set of truth-values, chosen to be designated, or
undesignated, if desired.
Lemma 2.1. Let Σ1 and Σ2 be disjoint signatures, let M1 be a Σ1-Nmatrix
and let M2 be a Σ2-Nmatrix. Further, let Γ ⊆ LΣ1∪Σ2(P ) be closed under
subformulas, and take v1 as a skelΣ1(Γ)-partial valuation over M1, and v2 as a
skelΣ2(Γ)-partial valuation over M2.
If the following compatibility condition holds:
v1(skelΣ1(ϕ)) ∈ D1 iff v2(skelΣ2(ϕ)) ∈ D2 for all ϕ ∈ Γ,
then setting v(ϕ) = (v1(skelΣ1(ϕ)), v2(skelΣ2(ϕ))), for ϕ ∈ Γ, defines a Γ-partial
valuation over M1 ⋆M2.
Proof. The compatibility condition guarantees that for each ϕ ∈ Γ the pair
(v1(skelΣ1(ϕ)), v2(skelΣ2(ϕ))) is a truth-value of M1 ⋆M2. One just needs to
check that the interpretation of connectives is respected. Assume, without loss
of generality, that ϕ = c©(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ∈ Γ with c© ∈ Σ1. Since v1 is a skelΣ1(Γ)-
partial valuation over M1 we know that v1(skelΣ1(ϕ)) ∈ c˜©(v1(skelΣ1(ϕ1)), . . . ,
v1(skelΣ1(ϕn))). Therefore,
v(ϕ) = (v1(skelΣ1(ϕ)), v2(skelΣ2(ϕ)))
∈ c˜©((v1(skelΣ1(ϕ1)), v2(skelΣ2(ϕ1))), . . . , (v1(skelΣ1(ϕn)), v2(skelΣ2(ϕn))))
= c˜©(v(ϕ1), . . . , v(ϕn)).
Hereupon, the Γ-partial valuation v built as in the proof of the above lemma
will be denoted by v1 ⋆ v2.
Take a valuation v over M1 ⋆M2. If we understand now π1(v) and π2(v) as
transformed into functions πi(v) : LΣi(P ∪Xi) −→ Vi in the obvious way, then
it is clear that they are compatible in the above sense, and that v = π1(v)⋆π2(v).
In other words, ValP (M1⋆M2) = {v1⋆v2 : v1 ∈ ValP∪XΣ1 (M1) is compatible with
v2 ∈ ValP∪XΣ2 (M2)}.
2.6 Classical logic
Classical logic, in any desired signature Σ, is 2-valued. We shall denote by
2Σ the matrix 〈{0, 1}, {1}, ·2〉 where c©
2
= c˜© : {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1} is the Boolean
function associated to each k-place Boolean connective c© ∈ Σ.
The most common Boolean connectives, namely ⊤ and ⊥ (0-place), ¬ (1-
place), ∧,∨ and (2-place) have their interpretations given through the fol-
lowing tables.
⊤˜
1
⊥˜
0
¬˜
0 1
1 0
∧˜ 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
∨˜ 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
˜ 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
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Valuations over 2Σ are dubbed bivaluations. We use BΣ = L2Σ to denote the
Σ-fragment of classical logic, and use ⊢BΣ to denote the associated consequence
relation.
Hilbert calculi for the corresponding one-connective fragments of classical
logic are well known, or may be systematically obtained from sections 2 and 3
of [24]. Possible axiomatizations for the above mentioned connectives are listed
below:
[B⊤] ⊤
[B⊥]
⊥
p
[B¬]
p
¬¬p
¬¬p
p
p ¬p
q
[B∧]
p∧q
p
p∧q
q
p q
p∧q
[B∨]
p
p∨q
p∨p
p
p∨q
q∨p
p∨(q∨r)
(p∨q)∨r
[B ]
p (q p) (p (q r)) ((p q) (p r)) ((p q) p) p
p p q
q
Other useful classical connectives may be derived from these, e.g., via a
translation t as below:
t( ) := λp1p2.¬(p2 p1)
t( ) := λp1p2. (p1 p2) ∧ (p2 p1)
t(+) := λp1p2.¬(p1 p2)
t(+3) := λp1p2p3. p1 + (p2 + p3)
t(if) := λp1p2p3. (p1 p2) ∧ (¬p1 p3)
t(T k0 ) := λp1 . . . pk.⊤, for k ≥ 0
t(T kk ) := λp1 . . . pk. p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pk, for k > 0
t(T kn ) := λp1 . . . pk. (p1 ∧ T
k−1
n−1 (p2, . . . , pk)) ∨ T
k−1
n (p2, . . . , pk), for 0 < n < k
The Boolean interpretation induced under t( c©) ∈ LΣ(P ) can be immedi-
ately obtained from the interpretation of the Boolean connectives in Σ as ex-
plained in Subsection 2.4, namely 2 c© := 2
t
Σ. Of course, such connectives may
be taken as primitive in some fragments of classical logic. The purpose here is
just to introduce a general mechanism to produce their interpretations. Note
that T kn , with 0 ≤ n ≤ k, represents the so-called k-place threshold connective
such that T˜ kn (a1, . . . , ak) = 1 precisely when n ≤ |{i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : ai = 1}|. Ax-
iomatizations for all the corresponding one-connective fragments, or in general
for fragments with several connectives, are not always straightforward but may
be systematically obtained using the techniques from [24].
Given a signature Σ of Boolean connectives, we say that a logic L = 〈Σ,⊢〉
is subclassical whenever ⊢ ( ⊢
2Σ
.
Remark 2.2. Clearly, ⊤ is a top-like connective, though not all top-like con-
nectives ought to be 0-place. In the classical setting, a k-place connective c©
is top-like precisely in case c˜©(a1, . . . , ak) = 1 for all a1, . . . , ak ∈ {0, 1}, i.e.,
c˜© = T˜ k0 . It follows that BTk0 = ⊤Tk0 for all k ∈ N. Analogously, ⊥ is a bottom-
like connective, but again not all bottom-like connectives ought to be 0-place.
In the classical setting, a k-place connective c© is bottom-like precisely in case
9
c˜©(a1, . . . , ak) = 0 for all a1, . . . , ak ∈ {0, 1}. It follows that B c© = ⊥ c© when c©
is bottom-like. Apart from ⊥ and from the projection-conjunctions ⊤, ∧ and
T kk for k ∈ N, all other Boolean connectives listed above are very significant. △
Remark 2.3. Classical negation ¬ is the only very significant 1-place Boolean
connective. There is only one other significant 1-place Boolean connective, the
affirmation connective, interpreted by setting λ˜p1. p1(a) = a for a ∈ {0, 1},
but it is of course a projection-conjunction. Further, if c© is any k-place very
significant Boolean connective and J ⊆ {1, . . . , k} is the set of indices of its
projective components, then |J | < k. In that case, of course, c©(p1, . . . , pk) 6⊢B c©
c©(p1, . . . , pk)
σ where σ(pi) = pi if i ∈ J , and σ(pi) = qi if i /∈ J . Note also that
any truth-preserving k-place Boolean connective c© is such that c˜©(1
k
) = 1. △
Next we state and prove a simple yet quite useful result:
Lemma 2.4. The logic of a non-top-like k-place Boolean connective c© with
k > 0 expresses some 1-place non-top-like compound derived connective θ. Fur-
thermore, all possible nestings of θ are distinct and none is top-like.
Proof. Let α denote the 1-place derived connective induced by the formula c©(pk).
If α is not top-like, we are done with θ = α. Otherwise, given that c© is not
top-like, there must be some bivaluation v such that v( c©(p1, . . . , pk)) = 0. Set
I := {i : v(pi) = 1}, and define the substitution σ by setting σ(pi) := α(p) if
i ∈ I, and σ(pi) := p otherwise. Let β denote the new 1-place derived connective
induced by ( c©(p1, . . . , pk))
σ . Choosing a bivaluation v′ such that v′(p) = 0 we
immediately conclude that v′(β(p)) = v( c©(p1, . . . , pk)) = 0, and thus θ = β is
not top-like.
As θ is compound we obtain that θn(p) 6= θm(p) for n 6= m. Clearly, θ0(p) =
p is not top-like. When n > 0, if θ is bottom-like then θn(p) is always bottom-
like, if θ defines affirmation then each θn(p) is also an affirmation connective,
and if θ defines negation then θn(p) alternates between affirmation and negation.
In all these cases, it is clear that 6⊢B c© θ
n(p).
To illustrate the construction in the proof of the above result, consider first
Boolean disjunction. The connective ∨ is not top-like, and α(p) := p ∨ p is also
not. Consider now Boolean implication. The connective is also not top-like.
However, α(p) := p p is top-like. Still, β(p) := (p p) p is not top-like.
We shall call CΣ2 the collection of all non-0-place Boolean functions com-
positionally derived (i.e., closed under compositions and projections) over Σ,
as interpreted through 2Σ. In the literature on Universal Algebra [4], C
Σ
2 is
known as the clone of operations definable by all derived connectives allowed
by the signature Σ. We denote simply by C2 the clone of all non-0-place Boolean
functions. A set Σ of Boolean connectives is said to be functionally complete
precisely when CΣ2 = C2.
Remark 2.5. Emil Post’s characterization of functional completeness for clas-
sical logic [23, 19] is very informative. First, it tells us that there are exactly five
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maximal functionally incomplete clones (i.e., coatoms in Post’s lattice), namely
P0 := C
∨
2 , P1 := C
∧
2 , A := C
⊥
2 , M := C
∧∨⊤⊥
2 , and D := C
T 32¬
2 .
The obvious projection functions λp1 . . . pk. pn, for 1 ≤ n ≤ k and k ∈ N,
form the minimal clone C∅2 , contained in all the others. The Boolean top-like
connectives form the clone UP1 := C
⊤
2 . An analysis of Post’s lattice also reveals
that there are a number of clones which are maximal with respect to ⊤, i.e.,
functionally incomplete clones that become functionally complete by the mere
addition of ⊤ (or actually any other connective from UP1). In terms of Post’s
lattice, the clones whose join with UP1 result in C2 are D, T
∞
0 := C2 , and
T n+10 := C
T
n+2
n+1
2 for n ∈ N. It is worth noting that T
1
0 = P0.
Further detailed analysis of Post’s lattice also tells us that every clone CΣ2
that contains the Boolean interpretation of some very significant connective (i.e.,
such that CΣ2 6⊆ C
∧⊤⊥
2 ) must contain the Boolean function associated to at least
one of the connectives of the following list [L0]: T n+2n+1 (for n ∈ N), T
n+4
2 (for
n ∈ N), ¬, , , , +, +3, if, λp1p2p3. p1 ∨ (p2 ∧ p3), λp1p2p3. p1 ∨ (p2 + p3),
λp1p2p3. p1 ∧ (p2 ∨ p3), λp1p2p3. p1 ∧ (p2 p3). △
What follows is an alternative characterization of very significant Boolean
connectives:
Proposition 2.6. Let Σ be a signature. The matrix 2Σ is saturated if and only
if CΣ2 contains no very significant connective.
Proof. Let ⊢ denote ⊢BΣ . Clearly, 2Σ is saturated whenever Σ contains no very
significant connective. Indeed, it is straightforward to show by induction on
the structure of formulas that, because no connective in Σ is very significant, a
non-trivial theory Γ⊢ is always precisely characterized by a bivaluation v such
that v(p) = 1 if Γ ⊢ p, and v(p) = 0 if Γ 6⊢ p, for every p ∈ P .
Now, suppose that c© ∈ Σ is a k-place very significant connective with j < k
projective components. We assume without loss of generality that the indices
of the projective components of c© are the first ones. Let s = k − j. Given the
present assumptions, and in view of Rem. 2.3, given distinct sentential variables
p1, . . . , pj , q1, . . . , qs, r1, . . . , rs ∈ P , we have:
(a) c©(p1, . . . , pj , q1, . . . , qs) ⊢ pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ j
(b) c©(p1, . . . , pj , q1, . . . , qs) 6⊢ qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ s
(c) c©(p1, . . . , pj , q1, . . . , qs) 6⊢ c©(p1, . . . , pj , r1, . . . , rs)
(d) c©(p1, . . . , pj , q1, . . . , qs) 6⊢ ri for 1 ≤ i ≤ s
If 2Σ were saturated then, from (a)–(d), and taking into account the theory
{ c©(p1, . . . , pj , q1, . . . , qs)}
⊢, there would exist a bivaluation v over 2Σ according
to which v( c©(p1, . . . , pj , q1, . . . , qs)) = v(pi) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ j, and simulta-
neously v( c©(p1, . . . , pj , r1, . . . , rs)) = v(qi) = v(ri) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. But
then 1 = v( c©(p1, . . . , pj, q1, . . . , qs)) = c˜©(v(p1), . . . , v(pj), v(q1), . . . , v(qs)) =
c˜©(1
j
, 0
s
) = c˜©(v(p1), . . . , v(pj), v(r1), . . . , v(rs)) = v( c©(p1, . . . , pj, r1, . . . , rs))
= 0, which is a contradiction.
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2.7 Cancellation, tabularity, determinedness
Let L := 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a logic. We say that L enjoys the cancellation property if
Γ∪(
⋃
i∈I ∆i) ⊢ ϕ implies that Γ ⊢ ϕ for all
⋃
i∈I ∆i∪Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ LΣ(P ) such that
the following conditions hold: (i) Γ∪ {ϕ} shares no variables with
⋃
i∈I ∆i, (ii)
∆i shares no variables with ∆j , for every i 6= j ∈ I, and (iii) ∆
⊢
i is non-trivial
for every i ∈ I. It is easy to check that any logic defined by a logical matrix
(for instance, classical logic) enjoys the cancellation property. A very interesting
result from [25, 27] shows that this property is also a necessary condition for
many-valuedness: a logic L enjoys cancellation if and only if L = LM for some
matrix M.
The logic L is called locally tabular if its associated relation of logical equiv-
alence ⊣⊢L partitions the language LΣ({p1, . . . , pk}), freely generated by the
signature Σ over a finite set of sentential variables, into a finite number of
equivalence classes. It is clear that every logic BΣ is locally tabular — that
constitutes in fact the theoretical underpinning of the classical truth-tabular
decision procedure. In addition, it is known (for a discussion on this topic
see [7]) that a logic that fails to be locally tabular cannot be finitely-valued.
Do note, however, that a logic may well fail to be locally tabular and yet be
finitely-Nvalued.
Let k ∈ N. The logic L is said to be k-determined if, for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆
LΣ(P ), whenever Γ 6⊢ ϕ there is a substitution σ : P −→ {p1, . . . , pk} such that
Γσ 6⊢ ϕσ. It follows from [7] that any k-Nvalued logic must be k-determined,
and consequently that if k-determinedness fails for all k ∈ N, for a given logic,
then this logic cannot be finitely-Nvalued.
2.8 Fibred logics
Let L1 := 〈Σ1,⊢1〉 and L2 := 〈Σ2,⊢2〉 be two logics. The fibring of L1
and L2 is the smallest logic L1 • L2 := 〈Σ12,⊢12〉 with Σ12 = Σ1 ∪ Σ2 that
extends both L1 and L2, i.e., such that ⊢1 ∪ ⊢2 ⊆ ⊢12. When the underlying
signatures are disjoint, the fibring is said to be disjoint. All the phenomena
we study in the present paper are instances of disjoint fibring. Note that, by
definition, fibring is commutative and associative, that is, L1 •L2 = L2 •L1 and
L1 • (L2 • L3) = (L1 • L2) • L3 for any given logic L3.
Given connectives c©1 ∈ Σ
(k)
1 and c©2 ∈ Σ
(k)
2 for some k ∈ N, in case c©1
and c©2 happen to be indistinguishable in L1 •L2 we shall say that c©1, c©2 are
collapsed by fibring L1 and L2.
Given Hilbert calculi H1 := 〈Σ1, R1〉 and H2 := 〈Σ2, R2〉 then L1 • L2 =
LH1•H2 , where H1 • H2 := 〈Σ12, R1 ∪R2〉. Clearly, besides joining the given
signatures, which allows for the construction of so-called ‘mixed formulas’, the
fibring of the calculi also allows ‘mixed reasoning’, where rules coming from one
logic are used in dealing with formulas coming from the other logic.
The next lemma deals with the semantics of the logic obtained by requiring
new inference rules to hold in the logic induced by a given Nmatrix. The first
part highlights the role of the notion of saturation, as wheneverR contains a non-
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axiomatic rule then the saturation proviso is fundamental (for an illustration of
that, check Ex. 3.19).
Lemma 2.7. Let M be an Nmatrix over Σ and H := 〈Σ, R〉 be a Hilbert
calculus. Sufficient conditions for the logic L = LM • LH to be characterized by
{v ∈ ValP (M) : v respects each ∆ψ ∈ R} are secured when either:
(a) M is saturated, or
(b) R contains only axioms.
Proof. Both cases are fairly simple. Let L := 〈Σ,⊢〉.
(a) As ⊢M ⊆ ⊢, every L-theory Γ is also an LM-theory. Thus, since M is
saturated, there exists v ∈ ValP (M) such that Tv := Γ = {ϕ : v(ϕ) ∈ D}.
Of course, given that Γ is an L-theory it follows that v respects the rules
in R. Conversely, just observe that Tv is always an LM-theory when v ∈
ValP (M), but Tv is also an L-theory when v respects the rules in R.
(b) Let Ax = {ψσ :
ψ
∈ R and σ : P −→ LΣ(P )}. Observe that Γ ⊢ ϕ if and
only if Γ ∪ Ax ⊢M ϕ. The result follows simply by noting that v respects
the axioms in R if and only if v(Ax) ⊆ D.
Remark 2.8. A semantics for disjoint fibring may be provided through a combo
of the operations for strict product and saturation. Assuming Σ1 and Σ2 to be
disjoint, and given Nmatrices M1 over Σ1 and M2 over Σ2, we know from [20]
that LM1 • LM2 = LMω1 ⋆Mω2 . Furthermore, as Mi is known to be saturated, one
can directly use Mi rather than Mωi , in the latter recipe. △
Let L := 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a logic, and c© /∈ Σ be any k-place connective. The
logic resulting from adding c© to L as a new unrestrained (resp., top-like /
bottom-like) connective is simply L • ⊥⊤ c© (resp., L • ⊤ c© / L • ⊥ c©).
Proposition 2.9. Given an Nmatrix M := 〈V,D, ·∗〉 over Σ and a k-place
c© /∈ Σ:
(a) LM • ⊥⊤ c© is characterized by the Nmatrix M ⋆M⊥⊤c© isomorphic to the ex-
tension of M with c©⋆(a1, . . . , ak) = V for all a1, . . . , ak ∈ V ;
(b) LM • ⊤ c© is characterized by the Nmatrix M ⋆M⊤c© isomorphic to the ex-
tension of M with c©⋆(a1, . . . , ak) = D for all a1, . . . , ak ∈ V ;
(c) LM • ⊥ c© is characterized by the Nmatrix M ⋆M⊥c© isomorphic to the ex-
tension of M with c©⋆(a1, . . . , ak) = U = V \ D for all a1, . . . , ak ∈ V ,
provided that M is saturated, or simply 2-saturated if k = 0.
Proof. First note that M⊥⊤c© is saturated.
Let Σ+ := Σ ∪ { c©} and fix Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΣ+(P ).
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(a) Let LM • ⊥⊤ c© := 〈Σ
+,⊢⊥⊤〉. It is easy to see that Γ ⊢⊥⊤ ϕ if and only
skelΣ(Γ) ⊢M skelΣ(ϕ). Soundness and completeness follow by observing
that ValP (M ⋆M⊥⊤c©) = {v ◦ skelΣ : v ∈ ValP∪XΣ(M)}.
(b) Let LM • ⊤ c© := 〈Σ
+,⊢⊤ 〉. It is easy to see that Γ ⊢⊤ ϕ if and only
Γ ∪ {ψ ∈ LΣ+(P ) : head(ψ) = c©} ⊢⊥⊤ ϕ. Soundness and completeness
follow by observing that ValP (M ⋆M⊤c©) = {v ∈ ValP (M ⋆M
⊥⊤
c©) : v(ψ) ∈
D for all ψ ∈ LΣ+(P ) with head(ψ) = c©}.
(c) Let LM • ⊥ c© := 〈Σ
+,⊢⊥ 〉. It is easy to see that Γ ⊢⊥ ϕ if and only
Γ ⊢⊥⊤ ϕ or Γ ⊢⊥⊤ ψ for some ψ ∈ LΣ+(P ) with head(ψ) = c©. Soundness
follows by observing that ValP (M ⋆M⊥c©) = {v ∈ ValP (M ⋆M
⊥⊤
c©) : v(ψ) ∈
U for all ψ ∈ LΣ+(P ) with head(ψ) = c©}.
For completeness, if Γ 6⊢⊥ ϕ then Γ 6⊢⊥⊤ ϕ and Γ 6⊢⊥⊤ ψ for any ψ with
head(ψ) = c©. As both M and M⊥⊤c© are saturated, we know that M ⋆M
⊥⊤
c©
is saturated and thus there is v ∈ ValP (M ⋆M⊥⊤c©) such that v(Γ) ⊆ D,
v(ϕ) ∈ U and v(ψ) ∈ U for every ψ with head(ψ) = c©. In view of this
last fact, we see that v ∈ ValP (M ⋆M⊥c©).
When k = 0 there is exactly one formula whose head is c© so, if Γ 6⊢⊥ ϕ
then Γ 6⊢⊥⊤ ϕ and Γ 6⊢⊥⊤ c©, or equivalently, skelΣ(Γ) 6⊢M skelΣ(ϕ) and
skelΣ(Γ) 6⊢M x c©. Since M is assumed to be 2-saturated, there is v ∈
ValP∪XΣ(M) such that v(skelΣ(Γ)) ⊆ D, v(skelΣ(ϕ)) ∈ U and v(x c©) ∈ U .
Thus, the valuation v ◦ skelΣ ∈ ValP (M⋆M⊥⊤c©) is such that (v ◦ skelΣ)(Γ) ⊆
D, (v◦skelΣ)(ϕ) ∈ U and (v◦skelΣ)( c©) ∈ U . We conclude that v◦skelΣ ∈
ValP (M ⋆M⊥c©).
2.9 Translations and fibring
We close these prolegomena with some technical results concerning the rela-
tionship between the disjoint fibring of logics induced by given logical matrices,
and the disjoint fibring of the logics obtained by some translations/abbreviations
over those matrices. The intricacies of these results are essential for understand-
ing how careful one needs to be when transferring examples or counterexamples
to or from a combination of logics involving connectives that are defined by
abbreviation. From this point on, we assume fixed signatures Ξ1,Ξ2,Σ1,Σ2
with Ξ1 disjoint from Ξ2 and Σ1 disjoint from Σ2, and translations t1 : Ξ1 −→
Σ1 and t2 : Ξ2 −→ Σ2. We shall write Ξ for Ξ1 ∪ Ξ2, Σ for Σ1 ∪ Σ2, and t
for t1 ∪ t2. We also fix saturated matrices M1 and M2 over the signatures Σ1
and Σ2. In case we are given non-saturated matrices M1 or M2, we can always
consider instead Mω1 or M
ω
2 . Let 〈Σ,⊢〉 represent LM1 • LM2 and 〈Ξ,⊢
t〉 repre-
sent L
M
t1
1
• L
M
t2
2
. Recall that LM1 • LM2 is characterized by M1 ⋆M2, and that
L
M
t1
1
• L
M
t2
2
is characterized by Mt11 ⋆M
t2
2 , as M
t1
1 and M
t2
2 are both saturated
(see Subsection 2.5).
Proposition 2.10. For every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΞ(P ), if Γ ⊢
t ϕ then t(Γ) ⊢ t(ϕ).
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Proof. The result follows from the fact that {v ◦ t : v ∈ ValP (M1 ⋆ M2)} ⊆
ValP (M
t1
1 ⋆M
t2
2 ). To see this, note that if v ∈ ValP (M1⋆M2) then v◦t = (π1(v)⋆
π2(v)) ◦ t = (π1(v) ◦ t
+
1 ) ⋆ (π2(v) ◦ t
+
2 ) where, for i ∈ {1, 2}, we are considering
t
+
i : LΞi(P ∪XΞi) −→ LΣi(P ∪XΣi) as an extension of ti : LΞi(P ) −→ LΣi(P )
defined as follows: t+i (p) := p for p ∈ P , t
+
i (ξ(ψ1, . . . , ψk)) := ti(ξ)(t
+
i (ψ1), . . . ,
t
+
i (ψk)) for ξ ∈ Ξ
(k), and t+i (xϕ) := skelΣi(t(ϕ)) for xϕ ∈ XΞi . Because
π1(v) and π2(v) are compatible, it is routine to check that (π1(v) ◦ t
+
1 ) ∈
ValP∪XΞ1 (M
t1
1 ) and (π2(v) ◦ t
+
2 ) ∈ ValP∪XΞ2 (M
t2
2 ) are also compatible, and
therefore v ◦ t ∈ ValP (M
t1
1 ⋆M
t2
2 ).
Note that the converse of the above statement is in general not true, and we
can have t(Γ) ⊢ t(ϕ) while Γ 6⊢t ϕ. When this happens it must be because
{v ◦ t : v ∈ ValP (M1 ⋆M2)} ( ValP (M
t1
1 ⋆M
t2
2 ). Let c© be a binary Boolean
connective, ⊥1 and ⊥2 be two 0-place bottom-like connectives and consider
B c© • B⊥1⊥2 . Now let t1 := id c©, t2(⊥1) = t2(⊥2) := ⊥, and t := t1 ∪ t2.
Clearly 2⊥1⊥2 = 2
t2
⊥ is saturated. Every valuation v over 2
ω
c© ⋆ 2⊥ is such that
v(t(⊥1)) = v(t(⊥2)), but it is not the case that v
′(⊥1) = v
′(⊥2) for valuations
v′ over 2ωc© ⋆ 2⊥1⊥2 . Hence, {v ◦ t : v ∈ ValP (2
ω
c© ⋆ 2⊥)} ( ValP ((2
ω
c©)
t1 ⋆ 2t2⊥ ).
At any rate, one may still secure the converse of the previous proposition
under certain particular circumstances:
Proposition 2.11. The following assumptions give sufficient conditions for
concluding that Γ ⊢t ϕ if and only if t(Γ) ⊢ t(ϕ), for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΞ(P ):
(a) t is injective, or
(b) ⊤ is the only connective in Σ2, M1 is unitary and M2 = 2⊤, or
(c) ⊥ is the only connective in Ξ2 = Σ2, t2 = idΣ2 , and M2 = 2⊥.
Proof. In each case, we prove that ValP (M
t1
1 ⋆M
t2
2 ) ⊆ {v◦t : v ∈ ValP (M1⋆M2)}.
Let v′ ∈ ValP (M
t1
1 ⋆M
t2
2 ).
(a) For i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, consider valuations vi ∈ ValP∪XΣi (Mi) defined, by
mutual recursion, as follows: vi(p) := πi(v
′)(p), vi(xt(ψ)) := πi(v
′)(xψ),
and vi(xϕ) is chosen compatibly with vj(skelΣj (ϕ)) for ϕ /∈ t(LΞ(P )). Note
that the injectivity of t is essential to guarantee that vi(xt(ψ)) = πi(v
′)(xψ)
is well defined.
(b) Note that XΣ1 = {x⊤}. Consider a valuation v1 ∈ ValP∪XΣ1 (M1) defined
by setting v1(p) := π1(v
′)(p), and v1(x⊤) being assigned a designated value
in the only possible way, and a valuation v2 ∈ ValP∪XΣ2 (2⊤) defined by
setting v2(p) := π2(v
′)(p), and let the value of v2(xϕ) be chosen compatibly
with v1(skelΣ1(ϕ)). Note that the unitariness of M1 is fundamental to the
construction of v1, whereas the fact that M2 = 2⊤ makes compatible
choices unique when constructing v2.
(c) Note that XΣ1 = {x⊥}. Consider the valuation v1 ∈ ValP∪XΣ1 (M1) de-
fined by setting v1(p) := π1(v
′)(p) and v1(x⊥) := π1(v
′)(x⊥), and the
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valuation v2 ∈ ValP∪XΣ2 (2⊥) defined by setting v2(p) := π2(v
′)(p) and by
letting the value of v2(xϕ) be chosen compatibly with v1(skelΣ1(ϕ)). Note
again that M2 = 2⊥ makes compatible choices unique when construct-
ing v2.
In each case, it is routine to check that v1 and v2 defined in this manner are
compatible and that v′ = (v1 ⋆ v2) ◦ t. This implies that if t(Γ) ⊢ t(ϕ) then
Γ ⊢t ϕ. The result then follows from Prop. 2.10.
Under the applicability conditions of the previous proposition, or in general
whenever Γ ⊢t ϕ if and only if t(Γ) ⊢ t(ϕ), we have the following interesting
consequences:
Proposition 2.12. Assume that Γ ⊢t ϕ if and only if t(Γ) ⊢ t(ϕ), for every
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΞ(P ). Then, the following properties hold:
– if LM1 • LM2 = LM for some matrix M over Σ then LMt1
1
• L
M
t2
2
= LMt ,
and
– if LM1 • LM2 is k-determined then so is LMt1
1
• L
M
t2
2
for k ∈ N.
Proof. For the first property, note that Val(Mt) = {v ◦ t : v ∈ Val(M)} by
definition, and therefore ValP (M
t1
1 ⋆M
t2
2 ) ⊆ {v ◦ t : v ∈ ValP (M1 ⋆M2)} which,
as in Prop. 2.11, implies that L
M
t1
1
• L
M
t2
2
= LMt .
For the second, we show that k-determinedness is preserved by t. Indeed,
from Γ 6⊢t ϕ we obtain t(Γ) 6⊢ t(ϕ). Assuming that LM1 • LM2 is k-determined,
we obtain that there is σ : P −→ {p1, . . . , pk} such that t(Γ)
σ 6⊢ t(ϕ)σ. As σ
only swaps variables, and t is the identity over variables, we conclude that they
commute, i.e., t(ψ)σ = t(ψσ) for every ψ ∈ LΞ(P ). Therefore, t(Γ
σ) 6⊢ t(ϕσ),
and so Γσ 6⊢t ϕσ. Thus L
M
t1
1
• L
M
t2
2
is also k-determined.
3 Fibring disjoint fragments of classical logic
In this section we shall establish the general results about combining Boolean
connectives and, in general, fragments of classical logic.
3.1 Adding top-like connectives
We start with the simplest cases where merging two fragments yields the
corresponding joint fragment of classical logic, namely, when all the connectives
from one of the given fragments are top-like.
Proposition 3.1. If the signatures Σ1 and Σ2 are disjoint and C
Σ2
2 ⊆ C
⊤
2 then
BΣ1 • BΣ2 = BΣ1∪Σ2 .
Proof. Consider a 0-place top-like connective ⊤ such that ⊤ /∈ Σ1 (if ⊤ ∈ Σ1
we pick a syntactically different copy). We obtain that BΣ1 • B⊤ = BΣ1∪{⊤}, as
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a simple corollary of Prop. 2.9. Just note that because BΣ1 is characterized by
2Σ1 , and B⊤ = ⊤⊤ and M
⊤
⊤ = 2⊤, we have that BΣ1 • B⊤ is characterized by
2Σ1 ⋆2⊤. Further, it is immediate to see that 2Σ1 ⋆2⊤ is isomorphic to 2Σ1∪{⊤}.
Since BΣ1 is characterized by the unitary matrix 2Σ1 and B⊤ = L2⊤ , we are
under the applicability conditions of Prop. 2.11(b). Let t be the translation
that sends every connective of Σ2 to ⊤. Hence, as BΣ1 • B⊤ is characterized by
the matrix 2Σ1∪{⊤}, we conclude by Prop. 2.12 that BΣ1 • BΣ2 is characterized
by 2
idΣ1∪t
Σ1∪{⊤}
= 2Σ1∪Σ2 , and therefore BΣ1 • BΣ2 = BΣ1∪Σ2 .
Example 3.2 (Coimplication and top). Consider adding classical coimplication
to top ⊤, that is, fibring the logics B and B⊤. Recall from Subsection 2.6
the semantics and axiomatization of B⊤. Coimplication is characterized by the
2-valued matrix 2 where:
˜ 0 1
0 0 1
1 0 0
We shall not explicitly provide here a Hilbert calculus for B . The methods
in [24] would allow one to obtain such a calculus, but the general procedure
is tedious and we leave it to the interested reader. We note that 2 is not
saturated: note for instance that p 6⊢ q p and p 6⊢ q, but no bivaluation
can set, at the same time, v(p) = 1 and v(q p) = v(q) = 0. However, in
this case, we can rely on Prop. 2.9, or more generally on Prop. 3.1, to conclude
that B • B⊤ = B ⊤ is characterized by the matrix 2 ⋆ 2⊤ = 2 ⊤. This
is, of course, a very special case, also because { ,⊤} forms a functionally
complete set of classical connectives (in fact, it is functionally complete in a
stronger sense, as it also allows for the standard definition of the 0-place Boolean
operations — see Section 3.14 of [17]). △
3.2 When none of the connectives is very significant
Another case where fibring yields the corresponding classical fragment comes
about when all the connectives involved fail to be very significant.
Proposition 3.3. If the signatures Σ1 and Σ2 are disjoint and C
Σ1
2 , C
Σ2
2 ⊆ C
∧⊤⊥
2
then BΣ1 • BΣ2 = BΣ1∪Σ2 .
Proof. We know from Prop. 2.6 that 2Σ1 and 2Σ2 are saturated, since the con-
nectives are not very significant. Hence, it follows from the results mentioned in
Rem. 2.8 that BΣ1•BΣ2 is characterized by 2Σ1 ⋆ 2Σ2. To conclude, just observe
that 2Σ1 ⋆ 2Σ2 is isomorphic to 2Σ1∪Σ2 .
In particular, this implies that if we merge the axiomatizations of two projec-
tion-conjunctions with the same arity we obtain a logic in which these connec-
tives collapse.
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Example 3.4 (Two copies of conjunction). We will now consider two syntac-
tically distinct copies, say ∧ and &, of conjunction, that is, we will combine
through fibring two copies of the conjunction-only fragment of classical logic,
B∧ and B&. Semantically, they are characterized by the matrices 2∧ and 2&
with &˜ := ∧˜ defined as in Subsection 2.6. A Hilbert calculus for B& is a simple
translated copy of the one provided for B& in [B∧], mutatis mutandis.
By Prop. 2.6, both 2-valued matrices are saturated since conjunctions are
not very significant. Indeed, Γ ⊢B∧ ϕ precisely when var(ϕ) ⊆ var(Γ), a non-
trivial theory Γ⊢B∧ is characterized by the bivaluation v such that v(p) = 1 if
p ∈ var(Γ), and v(p) = 0 if p /∈ var(Γ).
In view of Rem. 2.2 and the results mentioned in Rem. 2.8, or more generally
in view of Prop. 3.3, it is clear that B∧ • B& is characterized by 2∧ ⋆ 2&, which
is again 2-valued and where (up to isomorphism) c˜©⋆ = c˜© for c© ∈ {∧,&}.
Clearly, this means that the two conjunctions collapse and that B∧ •B& = B∧&.
Consequently, a complete calculus for B∧& is obtained by just merging the calculi
for the components. △
3.3 Non-finitely-valued combinations
We now start to establish the negative cases, that is, to identify the situations
when the fibring of classical connectives results in a logic that is subclassical.
Proposition 3.5. The fibring B c©1•B c©2 of the logic of a very significant Boolean
connective c©1 and the logic of a non-top-like Boolean connective c©2 distinct
from ⊥ fails to be locally tabular, and therefore B c©1 • B c©2 ( B c©1 c©2 .
Proof. In order to show that B c©1•B c©2 is not locally tabular, we shall build an
infinite collection {ϕt}t∈N of formulas in L c©1 c©2(P ), using only finitely many
distinct sentential variables, and then show them to be pairwise non-equivalent.
Let us first focus on c©1. Recall that B c©1 is characterized by the saturated
matrix 2ωc©1 . Let c©1 be a k-place very significant connective with j < k pro-
jective indices. We assume without loss of generality that the projective indices
of c©1 correspond to its first j arguments. Let s = k − j. As in the proof of
Prop. 2.6, we have:
(a) c©1(p1, . . . , pj , x1, . . . , xs) ⊢1 pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ j;
(b) c©1(p1, . . . , pj , x1, . . . , xs) 6⊢1 xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ s;
(c) c©1(p1, . . . , pj , x1, . . . , xs) 6⊢1 c©1(p1, . . . , pj, y1, . . . , ys);
(d) c©1(p1, . . . , pj , x1, . . . , xs) 6⊢1 yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
From (a)–(d), taking into consideration the theory { c©1(p1, . . . , pj, x1, . . . , xs)}
⊢1 ,
we may conclude that there is a valuation v1 over 2
ω
c©1
such that v1( c©1(p1, . . . , pj ,
x1, . . . , xs)) = v1(pi) = N for 1 ≤ i ≤ j, v1(xi) 6= N and v1(yi) 6= N for 1 ≤ i ≤ s,
and v1( c©1(p1, . . . , pj , y1, . . . , ys)) 6= N.
Next, on what concerns c©2, recall from Rem. 2.2 that a non-top-like Boolean
connective distinct from ⊥ cannot be 0-place. Hence, according to Lemma 2.4,
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we can fix a non-top-like compound 1-place θ ∈ L c©2({p}). Further, we know
from the latter lemma that:
(e) 6⊢2 θ
n(p) for every n ∈ N.
As B c©2 is characterized by the saturated matrix 2
ω
c©2
, from (e), considering the
theory ∅⊢2 we conclude that there exists a valuation v2 over 2ωc©2 such that
v2(θ
n(p)) 6= N for every n ∈ N.
Let us finally consider the following formulas on j + 1 sentential variables:
ϕt := c©1(p1, . . . , pj, θ
1+ts(p), . . . , θ(t+1)s(p)), for t ∈ N
In these formulas, we sequentially deploy s distinct nestings of θ on the sentential
variable p, in the positions corresponding to non-projective components of c©1.
Take t1 6= t2. We will show that ϕt1⊣⊢ϕt2 fails to hold, taking advan-
tage of the completeness of the saturated Nmatrix 2ωc©1⋆2
ω
c©2
for B c©1 • B c©2 .
For that purpose, consider Γ := {ϕt1 , ϕt2} ∪ {θ
i+t1s, θi+t2s : 1 ≤ i ≤ s},
and let x1, . . . , xs, y1, . . . , ys be the sentential variables in XΣ1 such that xi :=
xθi+t1s(p) = skelΣ1(θ
i+t1s(p)) and yi := xθi+t2s(p) = skelΣ1(θ
i+t2s(p)) for 1 ≤ i ≤
s.
As the mapping v1 is not defined for p nor for the special sentential vari-
ables xψ, for ψ ∈ sub({θ
i+t1s, θi+t2s : 1 ≤ i ≤ s}) \ {p}, but these variables also
do not occur in skelΣ1(Γ), we can extend v1 to a skelΣ1(sub(Γ))-partial valuation
v′1 such that v
′
1(p) and each v
′
1(xψ) are assigned designated values, respectively,
if and only if v2(p) and v2(ψ) are assigned designated values.
Similarly, v2 is not defined for p1, . . . , pj nor for xϕt1 , xϕt2 , and these vari-
ables do not occur in skelΣ2(Γ), so we can extend v2 to a skelΣ2(sub(Γ))-partial
valuation v′2 such that v
′
2(pi), for each 1 ≤ i ≤ j, and v
′
2(xϕt1 ), v
′
2(xϕt2 ) are
chosen to be compatible, respectively, with v1(pi) and v1(ϕt1), v1(ϕt2).
It is clear that v′1 and v
′
2 satisfy the compatibility requirement of Lemma 2.1,
and therefore the Γ-partial valuation v′1 ⋆ v
′
2 over 2
ω
c©1
⋆2ωc©2 does the job. As it
is clear that B c©1 • B c©2 ⊆ B c©1 c©2 , and also that B c©1 c©2 is locally tabular, we
conclude that B c©1 • B c©2 ( B c©1 c©2 .
We conclude from the above, in contrast to what happens with conjunction
(Ex. 3.4), that when we merge the axiomatizations of two copies of a very
significant connective we obtain a logic where these two copies do not collapse.
Example 3.6 (Two copies of disjunction). This time let us consider two syn-
tactically distinct copies, say ∨ and ||, of disjunction, that is, let us fiber two
copies of the disjunction-only fragment of classical logic, B∨ and B||. For an
illustration of the construction in the proof of Prop. 3.5 in the case of B∨ • B||,
note that the formulas θ1(p) ∨ θ2(p), θ3(p) ∨ θ4(p), θ5(p) ∨ θ6(p), . . . , where
θ(p) = p||p, are all pairwise non-equivalent.
Semantically, the above mentioned logics are characterized by the matrices
2∨ and 2|| with |˜| := ∨˜ defined as in Subsection 2.6. A Hilbert calculus for B||
is a simple translated copy of the one provided in [B∨]. Again, it is easy to see
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that the 2-valued matrices are not saturated. For instance, p ∨ q 6⊢B∨ p and
p ∨ q 6⊢B∨ q, but no bivaluation can set v(p ∨ q) = 1 and at the same time
v(p) = v(q) = 0.
It follows from the results mentioned in Rem. 2.8 that B∨ • B|| is character-
ized by the strict product of the saturations 2ω∨,2
ω
|| , the non-denumerably large
Nmatrix defined (up to isomorphism) by 2ω∨ ⋆ 2
ω
|| = 〈V, {(N,N)}, ·⋆〉 where:
V := {(X,Y ) : X,Y ⊆ N and X = N iff Y = N}
(X1, Y1)∨˜⋆(X2, Y2) :=
{
{(N,N)}, if X1 ∪X2 = N
{(X1 ∪X2, Y ) : Y ( N}, if X1 ∪X2 6= N
(X1, Y1)|˜|⋆(X2, Y2) :=
{
{(N,N)}, if Y1 ∪ Y2 = N
{(X,Y1 ∪ Y2) : X ( N}, if Y1 ∪ Y2 6= N
This is not unexpected, as classical disjunction is a very significant connective,
and therefore B∨ • B|| is known to be non-finitely-valued, as a consequence of
Prop. 3.5. Thus, B∨ • B|| is strictly weaker than B∨ ||, the two disjunctions do
not collapse — for instance, the mixed consequence assertion p ∨ q ⊢ p || q fails
to hold in B∨ • B||. The latter logic cannot even be said to be finitely-Nvalued,
as we can indeed show that it fails to be k-determined for any k ∈ N (recall
Subsection 2.7). To see this, consider:
Γk := {pi ∨ pj : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k + 1}, and ϕk :=
∨
1≤i≤k+1
q || (pi ∨ q).
It is clear that for every σ : P −→ {p1, . . . , pk} we have that σ(pi) = σ(pj) for
some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k + 1. Hence, it is straightforward to conclude in this case
that (i) Γσk ⊢ σ(pi) ∨ σ(pj), (ii) σ(pi) ∨ σ(pj) ⊢ σ(pi), (iii) σ(pi) ⊢ (pi ∨ q)
σ, and
(iv) (pi ∨ q)
σ ⊢ ϕσk , and from these it immediately follows that Γ
σ
k ⊢ ϕ
σ
k . Now,
to show that Γk 6⊢ ϕk, just consider a valuation v on 2
ω
∨ ⋆ 2
ω
|| such that:
v(q) = (N \ {1, . . . , k + 1},∅),
v(pi) = v(pi ∨ q) = (N \ {i},∅), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1,
v(pi ∨ pj) = (N,N), for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k + 1,
v(q || (pi ∨ q)) = (∅,∅), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1,
v(
∨
0≤i≤ℓ
q || (pi ∨ q)) = (∅,∅), for ℓ ≤ k + 1.
The merged axiomatization for B∨ •B|| is built as usual. More interestingly,
after [24], note that a complete Hilbert calculus for B∨|| may be obtained more
simply by adding the following interaction rules to the Hilbert calculus given
to ∨ in [B∨]:
p∨ (q ∨ r)
p∨ (q || r)
p∨ (q || r)
p∨ (q ∨ r)
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All the translated rules for the disjunction || are easily derivable from the latter
mentioned rules.
Note that what we said about merging two copies of the Boolean disjunction
applies mutatis mutandis to the case of two copies of the Boolean implication.
The reason is that classical implication is known to express classical disjunction,
e.g., via a translation t(∨) = λp1p2. (p1 p2) p2. △
An equally interesting non-collapsing example is provided by merging the
axiomatizations of two copies of classical negation:
Example 3.7 (Two copies of negation). We will now combine B¬ and B∼
through fibring, where ¬ and ∼ are two syntactically distinct copies of classical
negation. Semantically, they are characterized by the matrices 2¬ and 2∼ with
∼˜ := ¬˜ as defined in Subsection 2.6. A Hilbert calculus for B∼ is a simple
translated copy of the one provided in [B¬].
It is easy to see now that the 2-valued classical matrices are not saturated.
For instance, 6⊢B¬ p and 6⊢B¬ ¬p, but no bivaluation can fail to satisfy both
non-theorems simultaneously, that is, setting v(p) = v(¬p) = 0 is impossible.
In any case, it follows from the results mentioned in Rem. 2.8 that B¬ • B∼
is characterized by 2ω¬ ⋆ 2
ω
∼, a non-denumerably large Nmatrix. This is not too
bad, as classical negation is a very significant connective, and therefore B¬ •B∼
is not finitely-valued, as a consequence of Prop. 3.5. Thus, B¬ • B∼ is strictly
weaker than B¬∼, and the two negations do not collapse — for instance, the
mixed consequence assertion ¬p ⊢ ∼p fails to hold in B¬ • B∼.
A further interesting fact about this particular example is that B c©, for
c© ∈ {¬,∼}, turns out to have an alternative semantic characterization by way
of the 3-valued deterministic matrix M3c© := 〈{0,
1
2 , 1}, {1}, c˜©3〉 where:
c˜©3
0 1
1
2
1
2
1 0
What is more, this 3-valued matrix is saturated. Indeed, since Γ ⊢B¬ ¬
iϕ iff
Γ ⊢B¬ ϕ for i even, or if Γ ⊢B¬ ¬ϕ for i odd, a non-trivial theory Γ
⊢B¬ is precisely
characterized by the valuation v such that v(p) = 1 if p ∈ Γ⊢B¬ , v(p) = 0 if
¬p ∈ Γ⊢B¬ , and v(p) = 12 if p /∈ Γ
⊢B¬ and ¬p /∈ Γ⊢B¬ .
Now, in view of the facts mentioned in Rem. 2.8, it follows that B¬ • B∼ is
also semantically characterized by the 5-valued Nmatrix defined by M3¬ ⋆M
3
∼ =
〈{(0, 0), (0, 12 ), (
1
2 , 0), (
1
2 ,
1
2 ), (1, 1)}, {(1, 1)}, ·˜5〉 where:
¬˜5 ∼˜5
(0, 0) {(1, 1)} {(1, 1)}
(0, 12 ) {(1, 1)} {(0,
1
2 ), (
1
2 ,
1
2 )}
(12 , 0) {(
1
2 , 0), (
1
2 ,
1
2 )} {(1, 1)}
(12 ,
1
2 ) {(
1
2 , 0), (
1
2 ,
1
2 )} {(0,
1
2 ), (
1
2 ,
1
2 )}
(1, 1) {(0, 0), (0, 12 )} {(0, 0), (
1
2 , 0)}
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On the one hand, an axiomatization for B¬ • B∼ is obtained by merging the
calculi for the components. On the other hand, a complete calculus for B¬∼
may be obtained by adding to the mentioned axiomatization for B¬ • B∼ the
following interaction rules:
¬p
∼p
∼p
¬p
Completeness of the resulting calculus may easily be confirmed with the help of
Lemma 2.7(a). It is indeed straightforward to see that the valuations onM3¬⋆M
3
∼
respecting the two above mentioned interaction rules cannot use the values
(0, 12 ) and (
1
2 , 0). Purging the 5-valued Nmatrix from these values we obtain a
(deterministic!) Nmatrix that is isomorphic to M3c© on both components. △
Prop. 3.5 also happens to be informative when we combine distinct connectives:
Example 3.8 (Conjunction and disjunction). We will now add classical con-
junction ∧ to classical disjunction ∨, that is, we will combine through fibring the
logics B∧ and B∨. Recall from Subsection 2.6 the semantics and axiomatizations
of the latter logics. We have seen in Ex. 3.4 and Ex. 3.6 that 2∧ is saturated
but 2∨ is not. From the results mentioned in Rem. 2.8, it follows that B∧ •B∨ is
characterized by the strict product of 2∧ and 2
ω
∨, the non-denumerable Nmatrix
defined (up to isomorphism) by 2∧ ⋆ 2
ω
∨ = 〈2
N, {N}, ·˜⋆〉 where:
X∧˜⋆Y :=
{
{N}, if X = Y = N
{Z : Z ( N}, if X ∩ Y 6= N
X∨˜⋆Y := X ∪ Y
Given that classical disjunction is a very significant connective, and that classical
conjunction is not top-like, as a consequence of Prop. 3.5 we have that the
fibred logic is not finitely-valued. We actually also know from [21] that this
logic is not finitely-Nvalued. Clearly, B∧ • B∨ is subclassical and, for instance,
p ∨ (q ∧ r) 6⊢ (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r).
An axiomatization for B∧•B∨ may be obtained as usual. More interestingly,
after [24], a complete calculus for B∧∨ may be obtained by simply adding three
interaction rules to the calculus of disjunction, namely:
p∨q p∨r
p∨(q∧r)
p∨(q∧r)
p∨q
p∨(q∧r)
p∨r
All the rules of conjunction are derivable from the latter mentioned rules. △
We finish illustrating Prop.3.5 with a combination of two classical connec-
tives that results functionally complete:
Example 3.9 (Disjunction and negation). We now consider adding classical
disjunction ∨ to classical negation ¬, that is, fibring the logics B∨ and B¬.
Recall from Subsection 2.6 the corresponding semantics and axiomatizations of
the latter. We have seen in Ex. 3.6 and Ex. 3.7 that neither 2∨ nor 2¬ are
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saturated. However, we can consider the 3-valued saturated matrix M3¬ instead
of 2¬. Again, it follows from the results mentioned in Rem. 2.8 that B∨ • B¬
is characterized by the non-denumerable Nmatrix 2ω∨ ⋆M
3
¬ = 〈V, {(N, 1)}, ·˜⋆〉.
We leave the details of the verification to the interested reader. As classical
disjunction is very significant and classical negation is not top-like, Prop. 3.5
implies that the combined logic is not finitely-valued. We have further shown
in [21] that this logic is not finitely-Nvalued. Of course, B∨ • B¬ is subclassical
and, for instance, 6⊢ p ∨ ¬p.
The merged axiomatization for B∨ • B¬ is obtained as usual. More interest-
ingly, again after [24], a complete calculus for B∨¬ may be obtained by simply
adding the following four interaction rules to the calculus of disjunction:
p∨¬p
p∨q
p∨¬¬q
p∨¬¬q
p∨q
p∨q p∨¬q
p
The rules of negation are derivable from these.
The present example has the additional interest that {∨,¬} forms a func-
tionally complete set of classical connectives, and we obtain thus from the above
an axiomatization of full classical logic. △
3.4 Adding the connective ⊥
At this point, we are just left with the problem of categorizing combinations
involving the 0-place connective ⊥. We start by showing that all disjoint fibrings
of a fragment of classical logic with ⊥ are 4-Nvalued:
Proposition 3.10. If ⊥ /∈ Σ then BΣ • B⊥ is 4-Nvalued.
Proof. This is a simple corollary of Prop. 2.9. Note that BΣ is characterized by
the matrix 2Σ, and B⊥ = ⊥⊥ is characterized by the matrix M⊥⊥ = 2⊥. As ⊥
is a 0-place connective we need no more than 2-saturation. Hence, BΣ • B⊥ is
characterized by the 4-valued Nmatrix 22Σ ⋆ 2⊥.
Example 3.11 (Coimplication and bottom). Recall coimplication from
Sec. 2.6. When fibring B and B⊥, we make use of the general recipe in
Prop. 3.10, which shows that B •B⊥ is characterized by the 4-valued Nmatrix
2
2 ⋆ 2⊥ := 〈{0, 1}
2, {(1, 1)}, ·˜⋆〉 where:
˜⋆ (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 0)
(1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 1)
(1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
⊥˜⋆
(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)
Note that the non-determinism is again concentrated on ⊥. Furthermore, the
combined logic B • B⊥ fails the cancellation property: ⊥ q, p ⊢ ⊥ p yet
p 6⊢ ⊥ p. So, B • B⊥ is not many-valued, and it is therefore subclassical.
A complete calculus for B ⊥ may be obtained by adding to a calculus
for B the single interaction rule:
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p
⊥ p
Completeness of the resulting calculus may be confirmed using Lemma 2.7(a).
However, note that Lemma 2.7 demands the original NmatrixM to be saturated
in order to guarantee that the restriction that its proof promotes on the set of
valuations gives a complete semantics for any strengthening of LM. Hence, as the
matrix of coimplication is not saturated we cannot consider 22 ⋆2⊥. However,
from the results mentioned in Rem. 2.8, we can consider 2ω ⋆2⊥ knowing that
the underlying matrix is saturated and also characterizes B • B⊥. We thus
have that 2ω ⋆ 2⊥ = 〈2
N, {N}, ·˜⋆〉 with X˜⋆Y = X ∩ Y and ⊥˜⋆ = 2N \ {N}.
To conclude the argument, it is enough to show that for every valuation over
2
ω ⋆ 2⊥ that respects the above interaction rule there is a valuation over a
Boolean matrix that satisfies the same formulas. For that effect there are two
cases to analyze. Clearly, every v that fails to satisfy all formulas in the language,
that is, such that v(ψ) 6= N for every ψ ∈ L ⊥(P ), trivially respects the
interaction rule p⊥ p , and corresponds to the valuation over 2 ⊥ that sends
every sentential variable to 0. If instead v(ψ) = N for some ψ ∈ L ⊥(P ), then
v(⊥ ψ) = v(ψ) ∩ v(⊥) = N implies v(⊥) = ∅. Hence, v is also a valuation
over 2ω ⊥. △
It is worth noting that in some cases the disjoint fibring of the logic of some
Boolean connectives with ⊥ admits a semantics that is simpler than the 4-valued
Nmatrix obtained above.
Proposition 3.12. If ⊥ /∈ Σ and every connective in Σ is truth-preserving then
BΣ • B⊥ has a 4-valued characteristic logical matrix.
Proof. We know from Prop. 3.10 that BΣ • B⊥ is characterized by the 4-valued
Nmatrix 22Σ⋆2⊥. We will show that BΣ • B⊥ is equivalently characterized by the
4-valued matrix M4Σ∪{⊥} := 〈{0, 1}
2, {(1, 1)}, ·̂4 〉 where ĉ©4 := c˜©2 for c© ∈ Σ
(we take c˜©2 as the interpretation of c© in 2
2
Σ) and ⊥̂4 := (1, 0). The argument
we use here is a specialization of the one used in the proof of Prop. 2.9.
Let BΣ • B⊥ = BΣ • ⊥⊥ := 〈Σ ∪ {⊥},⊢⊥〉, and recall from Prop. 2.9 that
BΣ • ⊥⊤⊥ is characterized by the Nmatrix 2Σ ⋆M⊥⊤⊥ . Let 〈Σ ∪ {⊥},⊢⊥⊤〉 refer to
BΣ • ⊥⊤⊥. For Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΣ∪{⊥}(P ), note that Γ ⊢⊥ ϕ if and only if Γ ⊢⊥⊤ ϕ
or Γ ⊢⊥⊤ ⊥ (as B⊥ is axiomatized by the single rule
⊥
p
). Soundness follows by
observing that ValP (M4Σ∪{⊥}) = {v ∈ ValP (2
2
Σ ⋆ 2⊥) : v(⊥) = (1, 0)}.
Further, note that ValP (2
2
Σ ⋆2⊥) = ValP (2
2
Σ ⋆M
⊥
⊥ ) = {v ∈ ValP (2
2
Σ ⋆M
⊥⊤
⊥) :
v(⊥) 6= (1, 1)}, and therefore ValP (M4Σ∪{⊥}) = {v ∈ ValP (2
2
Σ ⋆M
⊥⊤
⊥) : v(⊥) =
(1, 0)} = {v′ ◦ skelΣ : v
′ ∈ ValP∪XΣ(2
2
Σ) and v
′(x⊥) = (1, 0)} = {(v
′
1 ◦ skelΣ, v
′
2 ◦
skelΣ) : v
′
1, v
′
2 ∈ ValP∪XΣ(2Σ) and v
′
1(x⊥) = 1 and v
′
2(x⊥) = 0} = {(v1, v2) :
v1, v2 ∈ ValP∪XΣ(2Σ ⋆M
⊥⊤
⊥) and v1(⊥) = 1 and v2(⊥) = 0}.
As for completeness, if Γ 6⊢⊥ ϕ then Γ 6⊢⊥⊤ ϕ and Γ 6⊢⊥⊤ ⊥. Hence, there
exist valuations w1, w2 ∈ ValP (2Σ ⋆M⊥⊤⊥) such that w1(Γ) = w2(Γ) ⊆ {1} and
w1(ϕ) = w2(⊥) = 0. Additionally, note that, as the connectives in Σ are all
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assumed to be truth-preserving, then v′
g
∈ ValP∪XΣ(2Σ) where v
′
g
(ψ) = 1 for
every ψ ∈ LΣ(P ∪XΣ). Consider vg = v
′
g
◦ skelΣ ∈ ValP (2Σ ⋆M⊥⊤⊥).
Now, for each α ∈ LΣ(P ), let
v(α) :=
{
(vg(α), w1(α)), if w1(⊥) = 0
(w1(α), w2(α)), if w1(⊥) = 1
.
In either case, v ∈ ValP (2
2
Σ ⋆ 2⊥), v(Γ) ⊆ {(1, 1)}, v(ϕ) 6= (1, 1) and v(⊥) =
(1, 0). Precisely because v(⊥) = (1, 0), we conclude that v ∈ ValP (M4Σ∪{⊥}).
Example 3.13 (Implication and bottom). Recall implication, , from Sec. 2.6,
and observe that it is a truth-preserving connective. When fibring B and
B⊥, in view of truth-preservation, by Prop. 3.12, we know that B • B⊥ is
characterized by the 4-valued matrixM4 ⊥ := 〈{0, 1}
2, {(1, 1)}, ·̂4〉 wherê4 :=˜2 (as in 22 ) and ⊥̂4 := (1, 0), that is:
̂
4 (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
(0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
(1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
⊥̂4
(1, 0)
Further, in B • B⊥ we have 6⊢ ⊥ p, and so this logic is strictly weaker
than B ⊥. A complete calculus for B ⊥ may be obtained by simply adding
to the calculus of B the single interaction axiom:
⊥ p
The usual rule for ⊥ is easily derivable. Completeness of the resulting calculus
may be easily confirmed using Lemma 2.7(b). Indeed, note that there are two
kinds of valuations over M4 ⊥ that respect the axiom ⊥ p : either v(⊥) =
(0, 0), in which case it is also a valuation over 22 ⊥, or v(⊥) = (1, 0) (resp.
v(⊥) = (0, 1)), in which case the only possible values for the other formulas are
(1, 0) or (1, 1) (resp. (0, 1) or (1, 1)). So, π2(v) (resp. π1(v)) is a valuation over
2 ⊥ satisfying the same formulas as v.
The semantic characterizations provided by Prop. 3.10 and Prop. 3.12 may
still be further improved in the very particular, and perhaps surprising, case
where all the Boolean connectives in Σ are expressible as derived connectives
with the sole use of bi-implication.
Proposition 3.14. If ⊥ /∈ Σ and CΣ2 ⊆ C2 then BΣ • B⊥ = BΣ∪{⊥}.
Proof. First, we prove that B ⊤ • B⊥ = B ⊤⊥. Since and ⊤ are truth-
preserving, we know from Prop. 3.12 that B ⊤ • B⊥ is characterized by the
4-valued matrix M4 ⊤⊥ := 〈{0, 1}
2, {(1, 1)}, ·̂4 〉 where ̂4 := ˜2 and ⊤̂4 :=
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⊤˜2 = (1, 1) (thus extending 2
2
⊤) and ⊥̂4 := (1, 0). We will show that B ⊤ •
B⊥ is equivalently characterized by 2 ⊤⊥.
Consider the bijection h : {0, 1}2 −→ {0, 1}2 such that h(1, a) = (a, a)
and h(0, a) = (1 − a, a) for a ∈ {0, 1}. It is straightforward to check that h
establishes an isomorphism between M4 ⊤⊥ and 2
2
⊤⊥. Indeed, first note
that h(⊤) = h(1, 1) = (1, 1) = ⊤˜2, and h(⊥̂4) = h(1, 0) = (0, 0) = ⊥˜2. To
see that h((a1, b1)̂4(a2, b2)) = h(a1, b1)˜2h(a2, b2) note that ̂4 = ˜2 is
commutative and analyze the possible cases: (i) h((1, 1)˜2(a, b)) = h(a, b) =
(1, 1)˜2h(a, b) = h(1, 1)˜2h(a, b); (ii) h((a, b)˜2(a, b)) = h(1, 1) = h(a, b)˜2
h(a, b); and (iii) if (a1, b1), (a2, b2) are two distinct undesignated values and
(a3, b3) is the other undesignated value, then h((a1, b1)˜2(a2, b2)) = h(a3, b3) =
h(a1, b1)˜2h(a2, b2). This shows that B ⊤ • B⊥ is equivalently characterized
by 22 ⊤⊥, and thus also by 2 ⊤⊥.
Finally, consider t1 : LΣ(P ) −→ L ⊤(P ) such that 2Σ = 2
t1
⊤ and t2 :=
id⊥. We are thus under applicability conditions of Prop. 2.11(c) and Prop. 2.12,
and from 2Σ∪{⊥} = 2
t1∪t2
⊤⊥ we conclude that BΣ• B⊥ = BΣ∪{⊥}.
The next example illustrates a rather special —and perhaps unexpected—
situation: the Boolean logic of bi-implication and ⊥ coincides with the fibring
of the corresponding one-connective fragments. This fact applies also if we
replace bi-implication with the connective +3 which is expressible using by
setting λp1p2p3. p1 (p2 p3). These results are to be contrasted, in the light
of Prop. 3.18 below, with the fibring of ⊥ with any connective in the list [L1]:
T n+2n+1 (for n ∈ N), T
n+4
2 (for n ∈ N), ¬, , , +, if, λp1p2p3. p1 ∨ (p2 ∧ p3),
λp1p2p3. p1∨ (p2+p3), λp1p2p3. p1∧ (p2 ∨p3), λp1p2p3. p1∧ (p2 p3). Note that
[L1] contains all the connectives in [L0] except and +3.
Example 3.15 (Bi-implication and bottom). We consider combining B and B⊥.
It follows from Prop. 3.14 that B • B⊥ = B ⊥. Thus, the fibred logic is 2-
valued and is characterized by the matrix 2
⊥
.
A complete calculus for B ⊥ may be obtained by simply merging calculi
for the components (a calculus for B may be found in [24, p. 332]). △
The following example provides further illustration on Prop. 3.5, and high-
lights the role of the condition concerning the nullarity of bottom in Prop. 3.14:
Example 3.16 (Bi-implication and 1-place bottom). Let the connective ⊥1 be
a 1-place bottom-like connective. This time we consider combining B with
the logic B⊥1 of ⊥
1, characterized by the Boolean matrix 2⊥1 , which is known
to be saturated by Prop. 2.6. As B is not saturated, we consider instead
2
ω . It follows from the results mentioned in Rem. 2.8 that B • B⊥1 is
characterized by the non-denumerable Nmatrix 2ω ⋆2⊥1 = 〈2
N, {N}, ·˜⋆〉 where
X˜⋆Y := (X ∪ Y ) ∩ (Y ∪X) and ⊥˜1⋆(X) := {Y : Y 6= N}.
As ⊥1 is a non-top-like Boolean connective distinct from the 0-place connec-
tive ⊥, and is very significant, by Prop. 3.5 we know that B • B⊥1 is not
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characterized by a finite matrix. Furthermore, we claim that B • B⊥1 is not
even finitely-Nvalued. We will show indeed that it is not k-determined. Let
ψi := ⊥
1(pi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k+ 1, and Γ := {(ψi ψj) ψℓ : i 6= j, i 6= ℓ, j 6= ℓ, 1 ≤
i, j, ℓ ≤ k + 1}. We have that Γ 6⊢ pk+2. However, given σ : P −→ {p1, . . . , pk},
it follows by the pigeonhole principle that there must be some i 6= j such that
ψσi = ψ
σ
j , and so Γ
σ ⊢ ψℓ. As ψℓ is bottom-like, i.e., ψℓ ⊢ p, we obtain
Γσ ⊢ σ(pk+2). Hence, B • B⊥1 is strictly weaker than B ⊥1 .
A complete calculus for B ⊥1 may be obtained by simply adding to a cal-
culus for B • B⊥1 the single interaction axiom ⊥1(p) ⊥1(q) . Completeness
follows by Lemma 2.7(b) and the fact that A˜⋆B takes a designated value if
and only if A = B, therefore every ⊥1-headed formula must have the same value,
and the functions that swap some undesignated points with ∅ are isomorphisms
between 2ω ⋆ 2⊥1 and 2
ω
⊥1 . We abstain from presenting here further details
as they are in fact very similar to the argument presented to the same effect in
Ex. 3.15. △
In contrast to the above, the following example shows that the situation
changes if we simultaneously add two 0-place bottoms, in which case a sub-
classical logic is obtained. We will consider the connective +3, but the same
argument would apply to the connective .
Example 3.17 (+3 and two bottoms). Let ⊥1 and ⊥2 be two 0-place bot-
toms. We consider merging B+3 and the logic of these two bottom-like con-
nectives, B⊥1⊥2 , characterized by 2⊥1⊥2 . Clearly, 2⊥1⊥2 is still saturated in
view of Prop. 2.6. Following the same recipe as in the case of a single bot-
tom in Prop. 2.9 (but now with 3-saturation), we immediately conclude that
B • B⊥1⊥2 is characterized by the Nmatrix 2
3
+3 ⋆ 2⊥1⊥2 . Choosing v over
2
3
+3 ⋆ 2⊥1⊥2 such that v(p) := (0, 1, 1), v(⊥1) := (1, 0, 0) and v(⊥2) := (0, 0, 0),
we have that v(+3(p,⊥1,⊥2)) = (1, 1, 1). Hence, the mixed consequence asser-
tion +3(p,⊥1,⊥2) ⊢ p fails to hold in the fibred logic, and so B+3 • B⊥1⊥2 6=
B+3⊥1⊥2 .
An axiomatization for B+3 may be found in [24, p. 331], and B⊥1⊥2 is
axiomatized simply by the rules ⊥1
p
and ⊥2
p
. A complete calculus for B+3⊥1⊥2
may be obtained by just adding to a calculus for B+3 •B⊥1⊥2 the two interaction
rules +
3(⊥1,p,q)
+3(⊥2,p,q)
and +
3(⊥2,p,q)
+3(⊥1,p,q)
. △
We see that the Boolean connectives definable by bi-implication still result
in a two-valued classical logic when combined with ⊥. This can never be the
case with other connectives, as we show below. We shall prove that the result
of adding ⊥ to a logic expressing any connective from [L1] (or equivalently a
connective from [L0] that does not belong to C2 ) fails to yield the corresponding
fragment of classical logic.
Proposition 3.18. If ⊥ /∈ Σ and c˜© ∈ CΣ2 for c© in [L1] then BΣ•B⊥ ( BΣ∪{⊥}.
Proof. Consider the list of connectives [L2]: ∨, T 32 ,¬,+, λp1p2p3. p1 ∧ (p2 ∨ p3).
Observe that [L2] is a sublist of [L1]. First, we prove that B c©•B⊥ ( B c©⊥ for c©
27
in [L2]. Note that ∨ = T 21 . In all cases, we shall take advantage of Prop. 3.10,
which shows that B c© • B⊥ is characterized by the 4-valued Nmatrix 2
2
c© ⋆ 2⊥.
— If c© = ∨ then ⊥ ∨ p ⊢ p holds classically but fails to hold in B∨ • B⊥, as
shown by a valuation v ∈ ValP (2
2
∨ ⋆ 2⊥) with v(⊥) = (0, 1) and v(p) =
(1, 0) 6= (1, 1), which is such that v(⊥ ∨ p) = (0, 1)∨˜2(1, 0) = (1, 1).
— If c© = T 32 then T
3
2 (⊥, p, q) ⊢ p holds classically but fails to hold in BT 32 •
B⊥, as shown by a valuation v ∈ ValP (2
2
T 3
2
⋆ 2⊥) with v(⊥) = (0, 1),
v(p) = (1, 0) 6= (1, 1) and v(q) = (1, 1), which is such that v(T 32 (⊥, p, q)) =
(˜T 32 )2((0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)) = (1, 1).
— If c© = ¬ then ⊢ ¬⊥ holds classically but fails to hold in B¬•B⊥, as shown
by a valuation v ∈ ValP (2
2
¬ ⋆2⊥) with v(⊥) = (0, 1), for which necessarily
v(¬⊥) = ¬˜2(0, 1) = (1, 0) 6= (1, 1).
— If c© = + then ⊥+ p ⊢ p holds classically but fails to hold in B+ • B⊥, as
shown by a valuation v ∈ ValP (2
2
+ ⋆ 2⊥) with v(⊥) = (0, 1) and v(p) =
(1, 0) 6= (1, 1), for which necessarily v(⊥ + p) = (0, 1)+˜2(1, 0) = (1, 1).
— If c© = λp1p2p3. p1 ∧ (p2 ∨ p3) then p ∧ (⊥ ∨ q) ⊢ q holds classically but
fails to hold in B c© • B⊥, as shown by a valuation v ∈ ValP (2
2
c© ⋆2⊥) with
v(⊥) = (0, 1), v(p) = (1, 1) and v(q) = (1, 0) 6= (1, 1), for which necessarily
v(p ∧ (⊥ ∨ q)) = (1, 1)∧˜2((0, 1)∨˜2(1, 0)) = (1, 1)∧˜2(1, 1) = (1, 1).
As it is clear that B c© • B⊥ ⊆ B c©⊥, in all cases considered above, we conclude
that B c©• B⊥ ( B c©⊥, for c© a connective from the restricted list [L2].
We now note that each of the other connectives in [L1] expresses some con-
nective from [L2] (actually, in all cases, either ∨ or ⊲⊳ := λp1p2p3. p1 ∧ (p2 ∨ p3)
may be seen to be a derived connective).
— If c© = T n+2n+1 with n ≥ 2 then ⊲⊳ is expressed by λp1p2p3. T
n+2
n+1 (p1
n, p2, p3).
— If c© = T n+42 with n ∈ N then ∨ is expressed by λp1p2. T
n+4
2 (p1
2, p2
n+2).
— If c© = then ∨ is expressed by λp1p2. (p1 p2) p2.
— If c© = then ⊲⊳ is expressed by λp1p2p3. (p3 (p2 p1)) p1.
— If c© = if then ∨ is expressed by λp1p2. if(p1, p1, p2).
— If c© = λp1p2p3. p1 ∨ (p2 ∧ p3) then ∨ is expressed by λp1p2. p1 ∨ (p2 ∧ p2).
— If c© = λp1p2p3. p1 ∨ (p2+p3) then ∨ is expressed by λp1p2. p1∨ (p1+p2).
— If c© = λp1p2p3. p1 ∧ (p2 p3) then ⊲⊳ is expressed by λp1p2p3. p1 ∧ ((p1 ∧
(p2 p3)) p3).
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This means that if c˜© ∈ CΣ2 for some connective in the list [L1] given in the
statement, then the same is true also for one of the five connectives in the
smaller list [L2]. Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that c© is in
[L2]. Let t c© be such that 2 c© = 2
t c©
Σ . We are thus under the applicability
conditions of Prop. 2.11(c) and Prop. 2.12 with t = t c© ∪ id⊥. Hence, from
B c© • B⊥ 6= B2 c©⊥ and 2 c©⊥ = 2
t
Σ∪{⊥}, we conclude that BΣ • B⊥ 6= B2Σ⊥ .
The following example illustrates, together with Ex. 3.11 and Ex. 3.13, the
variety of behaviors that may arise from adding a 0-place bottom to the logic
of a single classical connective, as described by Prop. 3.18:
Example 3.19 (Negation and bottom). We now consider fibring the logics B¬
and B⊥ of classical negation and bottom. Recall from Ex. 3.7 that 2¬ is not
saturated but we can consider instead the 3-valued saturated matrix M3¬. Note
also that M⊥⊥ = 2⊥, and from Prop. 2.9 it follows that B¬ • B⊥ is characterized
by the 3-valued Nmatrix M3¬ ⋆ 2⊥ = 〈{0,
1
2 , 1}, {1}, ·˜⋆〉 with ¬˜⋆ := ¬˜
3 and
⊥˜⋆ := {0,
1
2}.
To see that B¬•B⊥ is not deterministically many-valued we point out the fact
that ¬⊥ ⊢ ¬⊥ but 6⊢ ¬⊥, which implies the failure of the cancellation property.
It follows, of course, that B¬ • B⊥ is strictly weaker than B¬⊥. A complete
calculus for B¬⊥ may be obtained by adding to the calculus of B¬ a single
interaction axiom, namely:
¬⊥
Completeness of the resulting calculus may easily be confirmed using Lemma 2.7(b).
Indeed, we know from Prop. 2.9 that 22¬⋆2⊥ also defines the same logic. Clearly,
any v that validates the above interaction axiom ¬⊥ is such that v(⊥) = (0, 0),
therefore v is actually a valuation over 22¬⊥. △
4 Putting it all together
4.1 Characterizing the Boolean combinations
Building on Prop. 3.1, Prop. 3.3, Prop. 3.5, Prop. 3.14 and Prop. 3.18, from
the previous subsections, we are finally able to identify, in the next theorem,
the precise conditions for the recovery of a fragment of classical logic by fibring
disjoint classical components. The facts about Boolean clones highlighted in
Rem. 2.5 turn out to be essential in proving the result, which takes indeed
full advantage of the fact that every very significant connective expresses some
connective in [L0].
Theorem 4.1. If the signatures Σ1 and Σ2 are disjoint then BΣ1•BΣ2 = BΣ1∪Σ2
if and only if either:
(a) CΣi2 ⊆ C
⊤
2 for some i ∈ {1, 2}, or
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(b) CΣ12 , C
Σ2
2 ⊆ C
∧⊤⊥
2 , or
(c) CΣi2 ⊆ C2 and ⊥ ∈ Σj is the only non-top like connective in Σj, for i 6= j
with i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. If (a) is the case, then BΣ1 • BΣ2 = BΣ1∪Σ2 follows from Prop. 3.1. If
(b) is the case, then BΣ1 • BΣ2 = BΣ1∪Σ2 follows from Prop. 3.3. If (c) is
the case, then assume without loss of generality that i = 1 and j = 2. First
observe that BΣ2 = BΣ2\{⊥} • B⊥, and also B(Σ1∪Σ2)\{⊥} = BΣ1 • BΣ2\{⊥},
both facts being justified by Prop. 3.1 as C
Σ2\{⊥}
2 ⊆ C
⊤
2 . Thus, BΣ1 • BΣ2 =
BΣ1 • (BΣ2\{⊥}• B⊥) = (BΣ1 • BΣ2\{⊥}) • B⊥ = B(Σ1∪Σ2)\{⊥} • B⊥ = BΣ1∪Σ2 ,
this last step being a consequence of Prop. 3.14 since C⊤2 ⊆ C2 , and therefore
C
(Σ1∪Σ2)\{⊥}
2 ⊆ C2 .
Conversely, assume that BΣ1 • BΣ2 = BΣ1∪Σ2 and that neither (a) nor (b)
are the case. This means that one of the logics, say BΣ1 , expresses a very
significant connective, while the other logic, BΣ2 , expresses some non-top-like
connective c©. From Prop. 3.5 and Prop. 2.10 it follows that c© = ⊥. Thus,
it follows from Prop. 3.18 (and Rem. 2.5) and Prop. 2.10 that CΣ12 ⊆ C2 .
However, Ex. 3.17 and Prop. 2.10 show that there cannot be two syntactically
distinct 0-place bottom connectives, since λp1p2p3. p1 + p2 + p3 is expressed by
every very significant connective in C2 . Hence, we conclude that ⊥ ∈ Σ2 is
the only non-top-like connective in Σ2.
The following result formulates the precise conditions under which full clas-
sical logic may be recovered by fibring disjoint fragments of it. Again we take
advantage of Post’s lattice, highlighted in Rem. 2.5, namely using the identifi-
cation of the Boolean clones which are maximal with respect to ⊤.
Corollary 4.2. Let Σ1 and Σ2 be disjoint signatures such that C
Σ1
2 , C
Σ2
2 6= C2 but
CΣ1∪Σ22 = C2. Then, BΣ1•BΣ2 = BΣ1∪Σ2 if and only if C
Σi
2 ∈ {D, T
∞
0 }∪{T
n+1
0 :
n ∈ N} and CΣj2 = UP1, for i 6= j with i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. If BΣ1 • BΣ2 = BΣ1∪Σ2 , then one of the cases into which Thm. 4.1 is
divided must apply. However, cases (b) and (c) are not possible because in
those cases we would have CΣ1∪Σ22 6= C2. Thus, (a) must be the case, and
CΣi2 ⊆ C
⊤
2 , and actually C
Σi
2 = C
⊤
2 = UP1 simply because the other possibility
would be CΣi2 = C
∅
2 (the only clone properly contained in C
⊤
2 is C
∅
2 ). Hence,
C
Σj
2 ∈ {D, T
∞
0 } ∪ {T
n+1
0 : n ∈ N}, as these are precisely the clones which are
maximal with respect to UP1 (see Rem. 2.5).
4.2 Summing it up
In Section 3 we have analyzed several examples of combinations of classical
connectives produced through fibring (namely, by merging the corresponding ax-
iomatizations), including their characterizations through (logical) (N)matrices,
as well as the interaction principles needed for the corresponding fragment of
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classical logic to be recovered. It is worth taking a more abstract look at these
examples and the results that structure them.
A first batch of examples that was considered concerned the cohabitation,
in the same logic, of two copies of the same Boolean connective. Already there
one can find all sorts of interesting phenomena arising. As shown, the addition
(through fibring) to the logic of classical conjunction of another copy of classical
conjunction, with the same behavior, makes these connectives collapse into one
another (B∧ • B& = B∧&, Ex. 3.4). On the other hand, the analogous collapse
does not occur if we combine, say, two copies of negation (B¬ • B∼ 6= B¬∼,
Ex. 3.7), or two copies of disjunction (B∨ • B|| 6= B∨||, Ex. 3.6). As we have
pointed out, the fibring of two copies of the logic of classical negation does not
have a finite-valued characterization, yet is 5-Nvalued, and the fibring of two
copies of the logic of classical disjunction does not even have a finite-valued
non-deterministic semantics.
Another batch of examples we have entertained involved the combination of
two distinct Boolean connectives. Again, if such combination is produced via
fibring, aiming at a common minimal conservative extension of the logics of the
connectives given as input, several different phenomena may be observed. In
most interesting cases (such as conjunction plus disjunction B∧ • B∨ 6= B∧∨,
Ex. 3.8) the combined logic turns out to be subclassical and not characteriz-
able by a finite-valued Nmatrix, and this is also the case in situations (such as
disjunction plus negation: B∨ • B¬ 6= B∨¬, Ex. 3.9) in which one could have
expected the resulting logic to be functionally complete. However, there are
cases (such as coimplication plus top: B • B⊤ = B ⊤, Ex. 3.2) in which one
actually does obtain full classical logic without the need to impose any sort of
additional interaction principles involving the two connectives being combined.
A particular class of examples that deserved separate attention above in-
volved the combination of the logic of some standard classical connectives with
the logic of bottom-like connectives. To a bystander unaware of the results in
the present paper, the semantic behaviour observed in this last batch of exam-
ples might seem erratic. For instance, while combining the logics of negation
and of bottom gives rise to a 3-Nvalued logic (B¬ • B⊥ 6= B¬⊥, Ex. 3.19), and
combining the logics of complication and of bottom gives rise to a 4-Nvalued
logic (B • B⊥ 6= B ⊥, Ex. 3.11), adding a bottom to the logic of implication
results in a deterministically 4-valued logic (B •B⊥ 6= B ⊥, Ex. 3.13). Other
curious examples include the addition of a bottom to the logic of bi-implication,
which outputs the corresponding fragment of classical logic without the addi-
tion of interaction principles (B • B⊥ = B ⊥, Ex. 3.15), and the alternative
addition of a 1-place bottom-like connective to the same logic of bi-implication
(B •B⊥1 6= B ⊥1 , Ex. 3.16), which results subclassical, instead. We have also
considered an example in which the logic of a ternary odd-counter (a ternary
connective that is true iff exactly one or three of its arguments is true) is fibred
with the logic containing two copies of the classical bottom, and the resulting
logic turned out to be 8-Nvalued (B+3 • B⊥1⊥2 6= B+3⊥1⊥2 , Ex. 3.17).
The above mentioned seemingly capricious diet of examples was employed
both in motivating and in illustrating the results obtained in the present pa-
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per. Substantially advancing beyond the results of the investigation done at
our earlier paper [6], we have in the preceding subsection at last identified, in
Thm. 4.1 and Cor. 4.2, the precise conditions for the recovery of a fragment
of classical logic (for any arbitrary signature, with a 2-valued interpretation in
terms of logical matrices) through the fibring of disjoint Boolean components. It
is worth mentioning, nonetheless, that some intermediate results obtained while
establishing the foundations for these main results have helped identifying some
sufficient conditions for a logic (not) to be finitely-valued (Prop. 3.5), and in
several cases we directly showed that our illustrations had (or did not have) a
non-deterministic finite-valued characterization.
5 What lies ahead
In this paper we have fully uncovered the conditions under which merging the
Hilbert calculi of disjoint fragments of classical logic still leads to a fragment of
classical logic, or potentially to full classical logic, without the need to introduce
further inference rules regulating the interaction between the connectives from
each of the fragments. It comes as no surprise that this is an extremely rare
event, but there are a few non-trivial and perhaps unexpected exceptions, fully
identified at Thm. 4.1 and Cor. 4.2. The proofs of these results, which we believe
to be entirely novel, rely in an essential way on the ingenious classification of two-
valued clones by Post [23]. Analogous results for fragments of other important
logics are thus expected to be far from straightforward. It is worth noting that
as a byproduct of Prop. 3.3 and Prop. 3.5, we have also fully characterized the
circumstances under which collapses of classical connectives are produced via
fibring, namely, when we are dealing with two copies of a Boolean connective
that is not very significant.
Some of the results and the general techniques used in this paper are,
nonetheless, applicable well beyond classical logic. Overall, the present investi-
gation may be seen as an application of the recent semantic characterization of
disjoint fibring in [20], which uses in a fundamental way the advantages of the
non-deterministic environment permitted by Nmatrices. The myriad of interest-
ing subclassical logics that are obtained in all the cases in which the combination
of classical fragments fails to be classical, as illustrated in most of the examples,
are an immediate byproduct of this semantic technology, and that allows the
results hereby obtained to extend in a non-trivial way the preliminary results
in [6].
A more comprehensive understanding of fibred logics, even beyond the dis-
joint case, is an obvious avenue for future research. But several other narrower
alleys have been opened by the work reported in this paper. For a start, despite
having done so for all the examples analyzed, we have not been able to obtain
a general categorization of the cases when the logic combining two fragments of
classical logic fails to be finitely-valued yet still happens to be finitely-Nvalued.
It seems that a deeper understanding of finite-Nvaluedness is still lacking, paral-
lel to the results of [7] with respect to finite-valuedness. We have also not man-
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aged to prove in a systematic way the completeness of the calculi obtained by
the addition of new interaction rules directly from the Nmatrices characterizing
the fibring of the underlying fragments of classical logic (note that the resulting
calculi are known to be complete, as a result of the techniques introduced by
Rautenberg in his notable paper [24]). We left these completeness proofs open
in a few of the examples, as the notion of a valuation respecting an inference
rule turns out to be less innocent than it might seem. In order to systematically
tackle this problem, it seems that one should try to employ the technique of
‘rexpansions’, from [2], which advocates first expanding the Nmatrix at hand in
order to be able to split conflicting behaviours in the evaluation of connectives,
that may then be simply refined (purged from an undesired value) when one
needs to impose an additional rule on it. The completeness proofs we included
in our examples are basic instances of the rexpansion technique. Another, more
general but related, path to pursue is targeting a deeper understanding of the
algebraic properties of Nmatrices. A good example of the perplexities brought
about by such a seemingly innocent extension of the notion of logical matrix
concerns the definition of derived connectives by abbreviation, which amounts
to a straightforward matter for operations on matrices but which brings unsus-
pected difficulties in Nmatrices.2 In particular, a better understanding of more
general applicability conditions for our Prop. 2.11 can very well depend on such
a fundamental study of Nmatrices. Finally, it is important to get a better grip
on the role of saturation in the process of fibring logics, and its interplay with
strict products of Nmatrices. As we have seen, it is sometimes sufficient to
require k-saturation for finite k; we believe though that other milder forms of
saturation may play a key role in obtaining simpler (in particular, denumerable)
semantics for combined logics.
In closing, it is worth noting that the essential role played by the saturation
requirement in order to explain the semantics of the combined logics seems to
suggest that the emergence of interaction principles is connected with a lack of
expressiveness of the standard Tarskian framework for the study of logics (as
hinted also in [11]), and that the outcome of the present investigation would be
entirely different if we were to adopt multiple-conclusion logics, after [26].
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